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	Gulf War driving historic levels of global hunger by UN World Food Programme (WFP), agencies   25 Aug. 2026   Statement on Conflict and Hunger by Carl Skau, Acting Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP) to the United Nations Security Council:   "Conflict is the leading driver of hunger around the world. It is not only a consequence of conflict, it is increasingly being used as a weapon.   When the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2417 in 2018, it was a commitment to break the vicious cycle between hunger and conflict. Today, that cycle is accelerating. Consequences of conflict are now being transmitted thousands of miles through interconnected economies and trading systems, across borders and seas.   From Sudan and Gaza to Somalia, Yemen and beyond, the warning lights are flashing. When families cannot put food on the table, they face impossible choices: starve, move or rebel. And the cycle repeats itself.   I saw this urgency first-hand in Somalia last week, where families displaced by conflict and drought are again facing catastrophic hunger. Waiting for a famine declaration is a total failure of duty.   The global food system is now exposed to shocks that travel further and faster – from chokepoints in the Black Sea to the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz.   Disruptions to fuel, fertilizer, grain, shipping and humanitarian supply routes mean higher food prices, smaller harvests and fewer meals for children thousands of miles away. The Council has the tools to act on these risks. It must use them.   Protecting civilians, safeguarding the farms, markets, ports, roads and maritime corridors that keep food moving, and ensuring safe, unimpeded humanitarian access are not optional; they are imperative to give hundreds of millions of people a path away from hunger, violence – back to peace and stability. They are also obligations under international humanitarian law and essential to international peace and security.   The World Food Programme (WFP) stands firmly behind the Secretary-General’s call for Resolution 2417 to be implemented consistently and in full. WFP will continue to do everything possible to reach people caught in the crossfire as it adapts to a diminishing humanitarian funding landscape. But humanitarians cannot substitute political action.   Today must mark a renewed commitment by Member States to uphold international humanitarian law, protect humanitarian workers, keep food and aid flowing, fund lifesaving operations, and pursue the political solutions that remain the best protection against hunger".   http://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-acting-executive-director-statement-conflict-and-hunger   27 May 2026   Gulf War driving historic levels of global hunger. (WFP)   The US-Israel war on Iran has compounded other global disasters to drive record numbers of people into hunger at a time when funding to combat famine has fallen dramatically, the deputy head of the UN World Food Programme (WFP) has said.   The WFP says 363 million people around the world are now at risk of acute hunger, 45 million of them as a result of conflict in the Middle East and the consequent oil price spike.   The surge in need comes against the backdrop of a dramatic cut in funding last year by a third, with the US, the largest donor by far, cutting its contribution by more than half.   Carl Skau, who will become the WFP’s acting executive director on 1 June 2026, said the huge gap between needs and funding had forced the organisation to cut programmes supporting populations in food emergencies so as to focus on those already facing catastrophic famine.   “We take from the hungry to give to the starving. That’s the reality,” Skau told the Guardian. “Much of this is driven by conflict. Last year, we had two famines declared. That hasn’t happened in decades, so these are historic levels of hunger.”   The two famines declared in 2025 were in Gaza and Sudan. The situation in Gaza has improved slightly since the October ceasefire, while Sudan continues to be the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with famine persisting in parts of Darfur and South Kordofan.   “On the funding side, we had a drop of nearly 40% year on year,” Skau said, adding that it immediately affected staffing levels, particularly in Afghanistan and Yemen, where the Trump administration has cut off all emergency food funding. “We had to let go of 5,000 people. In Afghanistan, it’s meant we went from supporting 10 million to 2 million. It was a huge, huge drop last year.”   More than 300 million people were already facing acute hunger globally before the US and Israel started a war with Iran in February, which led to Tehran closing the strait of Hormuz and then a US counter blockade on Iranian shipping.   The WFP estimated earlier in the Iran war that if oil prices remained above $100, 45 million more people would face acute food shortages. The price of Brent crude fell below that benchmark in mid-May, but only after weeks in March and May when it was well above $100. It still costs 30% more than its prewar average and could rise again.   The war and the Hormuz closure have had several effects on global hunger and the WFP’s capacity to prevent people from dying from famine. Most directly, it drives up food prices, mostly because of transport costs.   “The price of food and energy is so closely correlated that in some places if the price of energy goes up 30%, food inflation almost meets that,” Skau said. “In a least developed country, amongst the most vulnerable, they’re already spending all their money on food, and so that means they eat 30% or 40% less.”   The spike in oil prices also directly affects WFP efforts to get food to the most desperately hungry. More of its operating costs have to go towards transport, and some aid routes have been blocked.   For example, border tensions with the Taliban government in Afghanistan in recent months led Pakistan to close border crossings, blocking the usual route for food aid. The Gulf conflict has since closed its second longest border, with Iran, so the WFP has had to resort to long and costly land routes.   The oil price hike and the inflationary surge it has sent across the world continues to negatively impact countries in need of WFP support.   Yet, total WFP donor contributions had already dropped from $9.8bn in 2024 to $6.5bn in 2025. In that period, US funding fell from $4.4bn to $2.1bn, while UK contributions declined from $610m to $435m. This year, the estimated funding needs are $13bn to reach 110 million people in need, but only $2.8bn has so far been received.   Those are all immediate impacts on hunger of the Iran war, and it is already creating severe problems for next year by cutting the supply chain for a third of the world’s seaborne fertiliser.   “In east Africa, all their fertiliser comes from the Middle East, and they don’t have the capacity nor the resources to buy elsewhere,” Skau said. “So that means that if this continues, there is going to be none, and eastern Africa is now heading into the planting season, so we will see the impact on productivity six or nine months from now.”   Beyond the immediate impact of the Iran war, Skau pointed to the corrosion of international norms that had made the work of humanitarian workers like WFP staff more dangerous than ever. More than 1,000 humanitarian workers have been killed while doing their job over the past three years.   “We really feel this broader sense of a challenge to the rule of law,” Skau said. “We feel it at the checkpoints, and the drone wars have been terrible. We’re losing more colleagues than ever – and certainly there is no accountability. It’s never been more dangerous.”   * The World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organization saving lives in emergencies. WFP support brings life-saving food to millions of people displaced by conflict and made destitute by disasters. For millions of people worldwide, WFP’s emergency relief during crises is the difference between life and death.   http://news.un.org/en/story/2026/06/1167653 http://www.wfp.org/global-hunger-crisis http://www.wfp.org/stories/how-mideast-crisis-deepening-hunger-far-beyond-front-lines http://www.fightfoodcrises.net/articles/gnafc-key-messages-and-analysis-2026-conflict-middle-east-acute-food-insecurity-and http://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-projects-food-insecurity-could-reach-record-levels-result-middle-east-escalation http://www.wfp.org/emergencies/middle-east-conflict http://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/strait-of-hormuz-crisis--fertilizer-scarcity-will-affect-next-harvests-and-food-supplies--fao-warns/en http://www.fao.org/in-focus/middle-east-conflict-2026/en http://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/hormuz-to-hunger http://www.fightfoodcrises.net/global-report-food-crises http://www.unicef.org/press-releases/famine-harsh-reality-children-acute-hunger-numbers-double-over-past-decade http://news.un.org/en/story/2026/04/1167374   http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/joint-news-release-wfpfaounicef-risk-famine-persists-nearly-195-million-people-face-acute-food-insecurity-sudan http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/joint-press-release-un-agencies-warn-worsening-hunger-and-malnutrition-crisis-somalia-famine-risk-emerges http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/wfpfao-millions-trapped-deepening-hunger-crisis-drc-needs-far-outpace-humanitarian-response http://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-2026-lean-season-unprecedented-food-and-nutrition-crisis-advocacy-note http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/wfp-scales-back-food-assistance-syria-amid-funding-shortfalls http://www.wfp.org/news/hunger-intensifies-south-sudan-78-million-people-face-high-acute-food-insecurity-and-22 http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghan-women-and-children-pay-price-crises-converge-and-funding-shrinks http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/countries-in-focus-archive/issue-152/en/ http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis   May 2026   States must act to protect Civilians in Armed Conflict   Protecting Civilians in Armed Conflict is a Responsibility that Member States and the UN Security Council Must Uphold. Statement by Principals of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC):   "As the Protection of Civilians Week unfolds in New York, we strongly condemn and raise the alarm about the growing and blatant violations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law meant to protect civilians in armed conflict.   Across conflicts, civilians, including children, are killed, injured, and displaced at an alarming scale. Sexual violence is used as a tactic of war, overwhelmingly affecting women and girls and devastating lives. Homes, schools, places of worship, hospitals, including maternal wards, are destroyed or damaged, as are civilian infrastructure and assets, such as water systems, transport network, markets, food production. Essential services are collapsing. Forced displacement is accelerating.   Conflict-induced hunger and famine are spreading, often driven by unlawful siege tactics, starvation, and the arbitrary denial of humanitarian access. This is happening despite the existence of clear obligations under International Humanitarian Law and the framework reaffirmed by UN Security Council resolution 2417 (2018), which condemns the deliberate starvation of civilians and the use of hunger as method of warfare.   And a decade after the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2286 (2016) that demands the protection of the wounded, sick, and medical personnel, violence, attacks and threats against healthcare workers and facilities continue with impunity. More than 10,000 incidents against health care facilities and workers have been verified to date.   Aid workers are also under attack and killed in unprecedented numbers. More than 1,000 humanitarian colleagues have been killed over the past three years. Many others are arbitrarily detained. Often the first to respond, staff from national and local organisations and community initiatives pay an unacceptably high toll. Many women-led-organisations addressing lifesaving protection and gender-based violence are being attacked.   From Gaza to El Fasher, and from Kharkiv to Beirut, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas is devastating civilian lives. At the same time, new technologies, including drones and artificial intelligence, are reshaping warfare and expanding the battlefield.   Wars have rules that apply to all parties to conflict. The problem is not a lack of law. The problem is the failure to uphold them consistently, the erosion of accountability and inaction, even in the face of atrocities.   Protecting civilians is a legal obligation and a moral imperative. For the sake of our shared humanity, rules that protect civilians must be upheld.   http://interagencystandingcommittee.org/inter-agency-standing-committee/statement-principals-iasc-protecting-civilians-armed-conflict-responsibility-member-states-and-un http://www.unocha.org/news/over-1000-aid-workers-killed-often-hands-member-states-un-relief-chief-demands-action http://www.unocha.org/news/ocha-tells-security-council-protecting-civilians-cannot-be-outsourced-postponed-or-diluted http://civiliansinconflict.org/press-releases/joint-civil-society-statement-ahead-of-the-2026-open-debate-on-the-protection-of-civilians-in-armed-conflict/ http://insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025-SHCC-Annual-Report.pdf http://www.hrw.org/news/2026/05/29/global-failure-to-protect-right-to-health-in-conflict http://www.icrc.org/en/statement/icrc-ifrc-world-red-cross-red-crescent-day-call-uphold-protections-civilians-medical-personnel-humanitarian-workers-communities-depend-on http://globalprotectioncluster.org/publications/2474/communication-materials/advocacy-note/poc-advocacy-note-civilian-protection-2026 Visit the related web page
	Africa’s Greater Horn region facing looming polycrisis by Tufts University, University of Juba   July 2026   Africa’s Greater Horn region is facing a looming polycrisis fueled by conflict, rising prices, climate extremes and disease warn experts from Tufts University.   The impacts of a strengthening El Nino weather system and the lingering effects of the war in Iran highlight two separate and seemingly unrelated global hazards. But in the Greater Horn of Africa, an area already beset by prolonged crisis and conflict, these factors are combining with others to potentially create a major, multicountry polycrisis.   As experts in famine, conflict and humanitarian crises, our concerns about such a grave risk for the region in the second half of 2026 and into 2027 are based on a series of overlapping trends that include El Nino, the broader effects on food prices and fertilizer of the Iran war, internal conflicts and other localized factors. We fear the consequences could be catastrophic.   Several factors underpin this risk.   First, the short rains in the eastern Greater Horn of Africa – parts of Somalia, eastern Kenya, eastern Ethiopia – were well below average in the fall of 2025. The long rains in March to May of 2026 were also well below normal for much of that area, affecting both crops production and grazing and water for livestock, deepening the crisis of rural livelihoods.   The regional forecast for the northern Horn of Africa, where for the most part there is only one rainy season per year, is also projected to be below average. This includes the heavily populated highlands of Ethiopia, much of South Sudan and Sudan.   The super El Nino now forming could cause both drought and extensive flooding in parts of the Greater Horn of Africa, causing population displacement and tremendous loss of livelihoods.   Second, an unpredictable variant of the Ebola virus has taken hold in Congo and Uganda. Although it hasn’t yet spread to the rest of the region, the concern is that if Ebola spreads across the border to South Sudan, it will not only add a major epidemic risk but will also render the response to other shocks more difficult.   Third is the fact that all of the countries in the Greater Horn, with the exception of Kenya, are experiencing protracted, violent conflicts, with multiple parties jockeying for power and military advantage. This makes the task of dealing with the impact of climate, health and price shocks that much harder and risks further exacerbating or accelerating individual drivers.   Regional analysts have warned of an uptick in violence for Ethiopia and South Sudan. Violent conflict is a common denominator of contemporary famine, and famine or the risk of famine has already been noted in several countries in the region.   Conflict outside the region is also complicating matters. The war in Iran has already led to significant increases in transportation and food costs in the short term. But potentially more concerning is the fertilizer shortage caused by the war, which is projected to reduce harvests later in the year. If this happens, food prices will remain high long after the active conflict ends.   The Horn of Africa will be doubly affected by the fertilizer bottleneck – local production will be reduced, and global food prices will be higher. The bottleneck affects regional surplus-producing areas that might normally help to even out availability and prices in areas that do not produce enough to feed themselves.   The El Nino effects, in combination with the high fertilizer costs, will likely reduce opportunities for agricultural work while also increasing the amount that food laborers – among the poorest people – have to spend on produce.   This combination of climatic, conflict, market and epidemic shocks are not simply additive but multiplicative, with each intensifying the other. Climate and epidemic shocks almost inevitably exacerbate conflict and encourage crackdowns on population movements.   To make matters worse, there are reasons to believe that the region will be less prepared to cope with the looming crisis than during previous El Nino years.   In the background is the deliberate gutting of much of the global humanitarian response infrastructure that people would have relied on in the past to mitigate the impacts of such a crisis.   In particular, the closure of USAID and the major cuts in spending on foreign aid – not only by the U.S. but by most Western nations – has undermined much of the international system’s capacity to respond to major shocks.   Combined with longer-term political and governance challenges in eastern Africa, this conjunction of existing and anticipated factors in the Horn of Africa risks both further displacement and a rise in mortality.   There have already been calls by aid groups and regional bodies for higher levels of funding to be allocated through what remains of the international system.   Humanitarian programs have been shut down, staff have been laid off and infrastructure sold. Government-led programs in epidemic tracking and the provision of healthcare and other areas have likewise been curtailed.   Washington has recently increased its level of funding slightly, but U.S. humanitarian assistance is now more politicized and transactional, less sufficient and limited in its support of effective local systems and responses.   With the international humanitarian system compromised by funding cuts, the onus will be more heavily on governments, civil society and local communities in the Horn to mitigate anticipated shocks and their fallout.   The first responders in any crisis are usually next of kin, neighbors and local mutual aid groups. Since the collapse of the international aid system a year ago, long-standing efforts by local communities and organizations have ramped up significantly and effectively. These local mutual aid efforts are typically self-managed and financed through their own networks and diaspora remittances.   But given the size of budget cuts in the formal humanitarian response system, these local initiatives can be better supported with complementary funding. Several intermediary organizations have recently emerged to support this effort.   Local mutual aid efforts can also be supported through more flexible public policies, for example, by easing restrictions on banking transfers to enable more effective diaspora support. Donors and the U.N. can also ensure that greater proportions of funding in the formal global humanitarian system go to local initiatives.   Fundamentally, however, the most worrisome driver behind this polycrisis is violent conflict – wars in this region and elsewhere.   In addition to the impacts of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, civil wars and ongoing insurgencies in Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia have also been dragging on for years and in some cases have drawn in more countries – either directly through financial support and weapons sales or indirectly through political support.   Not only does violent conflict complicate any response to crisis, it also raises the risk of starvation being used as a weapon of war – something already alleged in Sudan and the Tigray region of Ethiopia. But for the most part, the international community has been unwilling to hold warring parties and their foreign supporters accountable for intentionally starving parts of their populations.   Finally, data and monitoring systems have also been significantly crippled by aid cuts and misinformation, making it difficult to understand the gravity of these crises or to keep actors accountable. Improved monitoring and evidence, including evidence of atrocities and the use of starvation as a weapon, need to be supported if there is to be effective assistance and accountability.   The conjunction of so many potential hazards has all the hallmarks of the proverbial perfect storm. Not only will people’s access to adequate food be devastated, it will also affect civilian protection, access and mobility.   Without immediate prevention measures, the looming polycrisis will have widespread impacts on basic health, nutrition and water services – and the potential for mass mortality and displacement.   http://theconversation.com/africas-greater-horn-region-is-facing-a-looming-polycrisis-fueled-by-conflict-prices-climate-and-disease-286071
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