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	Achieving Long-term Political Change in the Middle East by Rami Khouri, Fawaz Gerges, Dov S. Zakheim Yale Global / Arabic Media Internet Network   May 04, 2005   "The Revolution will be Bottom Up", by Rami Khouri.   Right about now, those people who wish to see if democracy will take root and spread throughout the Arab world should be shifting their gaze from the lofty declarations of politicians in Arab and Western capitals to the more ordinary, less-glamorous activities of democratic activists at the local level. The testing ground for Arab democracy will be the nitty-gritty of local politics, painstaking organizational work, mobilizing constituencies and communities, and fostering neighborhood-level citizen participation and accountability.   Such democratic aspirations mirror the ward and street politics of Boston and Chicago a century ago, when strongmen made deals and used muscle to enforce them, formal laws were bent and rewritten to suit the power balances of tribal and religious leaders, families and ethnic sects dominated local politics for generations, passing on incumbency to their sons and brothers like a royal title, always making sure that the local judges and police were happy and on your side.   Chicago and Boston of a century ago in many ways mirror the power dynamics of Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, Tripoli, Amman, Sanaa, Khartoum and Tunis today. This is no surprise, for most autocratic societies in the earliest stages of transition toward democracy show hybrid notions of the rule of law combined with the rule of the jungle and the gun.   The Arab world today is at a juncture in its modern political development, and it could move in any of several directions. The preferred option for most Arab ruling regimes is to make some economic and superficial political changes that do not touch the core concentration of political power in the hands of the traditional ruling elite. Cosmetic changes to governance systems—allowing elections, private newspapers and political parties, for example—effectively maintain all important political decision-making in the hands of a small, unaccountable political and security elite. Many local citizens and foreign governments alike are frustrated with this traditional strategy of slow motion, part-time, unconvincing, unserious Arab reform.   The antidote to deceptive Arab democracy from above is day-to-day efforts from below. The transition from the current top-heavy, semi-feudal Arab power structure to a more egalitarian, democratic system will reflect demand pressures from below—not generous democracy gifts from above. Here, non-governmental and civil society organizations build the culture and structures of democracy, one person and one issue at a time, in elections, accountability, anti-corruption efforts, the rule of law and many other fields. The cumulative impact of such efforts will eventually generate a momentum among the citizenry that demands better governance from public officials—and holds them accountable.   This process is visible in many Arab countries, but particularly so in Lebanon as the country gears up for the parliamentary elections in May and June. While the parliament and professional politicians wrangle over electoral laws and districts—aiming mainly to ensure their own incumbency—the more significant determinants of Lebanon's democratic aspirations will emerge over time from the work of people like Ziad Barood and Oussama Safa.   Lawyer Ziad Barood heads the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections, which has formed a nationwide coalition of more than 40 other NGOs—including universities, local societies, women's groups and others—to train 3,000 election monitors. They want to have a dozen trained independent monitors at every polling station. They are also training election observers from the country's many political parties.   "We sense that the Lebanese people want to reclaim their republic and its values, to build a new country that tackles its issues more responsibly," he explained to me in his Beirut law office this week. "The difference we notice now, after so many Lebanese took to the streets and made their views known in recent months, is that some leaders are being forced to follow the lead of the people, instead of the other way around. The people may be leading the leaders."   The elections are an opportunity for citizens to place conditions on their traditional leaders, and then hold them accountable, he says. "We sense a great deal of new interests in election monitoring, which we've done since 1996. A new generation of Lebanese is interested to participate in civil society and politics, and they are searching for vehicles through which they can express their values and define the country's values also."   Oussama Safa, the General Director of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), sees the many Lebanese who took to the streets recently as a force for change whose goals have not been clearly articulated yet. Yet he and many of his colleagues feel that the process of change has started in Lebanon, aiming both to open up the political system and address some of its most rigid elements.   LCPS is part of the election monitoring coalition because it shares the view that a broad-based, national coalition of civil society groups can have an impact on the political culture.   "Many Lebanese resent the manipulation of their electoral politics. The revival of civil society activities in recent months is a sign that people are more confident and mature, and feel that they can do something about this," he notes.   LCPS itself, with technical assistance from foreign NGOs, will conduct exit polls during the election, making it more difficult for anyone to tamper with the election results. It will conduct focus groups before and after the voting, concentrating on youth and women—traditionally apathetic voters. It is also revising and reissuing a booklet on electoral fraud techniques, for use by monitors, government officials and others in charge of the elections. Several regional and national roundtables will look at campaign financing, candidate accountability and transparency of the electoral process.   Every day, dozens of volunteers in these and other civil society groups gather in their offices and homes, reviewing activities, planning strategy and painstakingly working to transform autocratic Arab political systems into more democratic ones. This is where the struggle for Arab modernity and sensible governance is being waged at its most serious and potentially effective level.   (Rami G. Khouri is editor at large of the Beirut-based Daily Star newspaper, published throughout the Middle East with the International Herald Tribune. This article was published by Tompaine.com).   Copyright © 2005 Rami G. Khouri / Agence Global   25 April 2005   "Is Democracy in the Middle East a Pipedream", by Fawaz Gerges. (YaleGlobal).   From Baghdad to Beirut and from Cairo to Jerusalem, stirrings of freedom are unsettling deeply entrenched autocratic rulers, as Arab civil societies are beginning to challenge their ruling tormentors. In Egypt, for instance, one of the most populous and important Arab states, President Hosni Mubarak responded to critics of his autocratic style by agreeing to hold free elections Although it is too early to draw any definite conclusions about the nature and substance of recent developments, they point to a more assertive civil society and a real longing for political empowerment and emancipation. Careful support and nurturing by the West will be critical for their success.   Most Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East are fed up with their ruling autocrats, who had promised heaven but delivered dust and tyranny. These sentiments clearly show that there is nothing unique or intrinsic about Arab and Islamic culture that inhibits democratic governance. Like their counterparts elsewhere, Arabs and Muslims have struggled to free themselves from the shackles of political authoritarianism without much success, thanks partly to the support given by the West, particularly the United States, to powerful dictators.   This support, of course, is rooted in history. At the heart of the problem in the developing world, including Middle Eastern countries, lays the fact that the new elite that assumed power after the end of colonialism came mostly from the military-security apparatus, one that is deeply hierarchical, rigid, and authoritarian. The colonial state invested many more resources in the military-security apparatus than in other civil-legal institutions in order to maintain control over restive indigenous societies.   In the 1950s and 1960s, in most Arab/Muslim countries, including Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and Libya, young army officers launched coup-d'états and seized power from the regimes affiliated with the loathed British and French colonialists. One can speculate at the extent to which the colonial state's conduct alienated people further from Western constitutionalism and the concept of representative government.   In the last decade, the further economic weakening of Middle Eastern states has brought popular dissatisfaction to the fore. Islamists – political activists who aim to abolish secular, social, and political order and replace it with an Islamic one – are the main beneficiaries of the decline of the post-colonial state. Of all the social and political groups, Islamists tend to be the most successful in building large constituencies, thanks to the social and economic services they provide to a suffering population. Instead of directly tackling the existential crisis facing their societies, secular Arab rulers have used the fear of Islamism to perpetuate their absolute control.   Now, however, we are witnessing the emergence of rudimentary social movements that could dramatically revolutionize Arab and Muslim politics. These movements – be they professional associations, workers organizations, students, or women's groups – are much more assertive, mobilized, and challenging of governments' autocratic methods, thanks to the power of the new media, which has broken official monopoly on the flow of information. As a result, consensus is emerging in the Muslim world regarding respect for human rights, legal transparency, and the peaceful transfer of power.   Even mainstream Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the most powerful transnational organization, have now come to this very same conclusion: Democracy is the most effective mechanism to guard against political authoritarianism and protect the human rights of the Muslim Ummah (the Muslim community worldwide).   Still, in the minds of many Arabs and Muslims, liberal democracy remains synonymous with Western political hegemony and domination. Democracy tends to be seen as a manipulative tool wielded by Western powers to intervene in Arab/Muslim internal affairs and to divide and conquer.   Within the past 10 years, mainstream Islamic voices have worked arduously to redefine liberal democracy in Islamic terms and make it comprehensible and acceptable to Arab and Muslim masses. Simply put, Muslim and Islamic democrats have been trying to Islamize democracy and modernity and strip them of their Western clothing. Although they have come far, the journey is just beginning. Islamicizing liberal democracy is still a work in progress; a great deal of hard work remains.   There now exists a two-pronged dialectic: anti-Muslim sentiments in the Christian West and anti-Western sentiments in the world of Islam, which run parallel. Widespread apprehension remains regarding Bush's intentions and policies throughout Arab and Muslim lands. Many Arabs and Muslims are reluctant to buy what they perceive to be his unauthentic and faulty democratic goods. They view his rhetoric as a means to justify and legitimize his illegal invasion of Iraq to the American people, as well as to wage a relentless war against Arabs and Muslims. Leading social and political groups vehemently oppose intervention by the great powers, particularly the United States, in their internal affairs under any pretext, including that of spreading democracy.   On the other hand, anti-Islamic sentiment has risen in the West in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks. Even in traditionally tolerant societies, like France and the Netherlands, there have been growing voices against Islam.   While Muslim liberal and democratic voices are concerned about Islamophobia, they are also anxious about public backlash against American intervention in their countries' internal affairs. They prefer that the international community led by the United Nations, not the United States, lead the drive for promoting democratic governance in the area by exerting pressure on Muslim dictators to open up their political systems.   For all these reasons, the promotion of liberalism and democratization must be accompanied by a genuine and systematic struggle to confront the root causes and manifestations of the rising Islamophobia in the Christian West and deepening anti-American sentiments in the Muslim world.   For now, some of the rhetoric coming out from Washington is refreshing, and carries tremendous potential for American foreign policy and Middle Eastern societies alike. There is no denying that there is fresh thinking in Washington regarding the need to support the aspirations of democratic voices in the area, as well as to keep a healthy distance from Arab dictators. Only time will tell if this appreciation gets institutionalized within the decision-making process, or whether US policymakers will ultimately revert to the simple business-as-usual approach with Arab dictators.   The United States could be much more effective if it worked jointly with the international community in assisting progressive forces in the region. A broad coalition could more successfully exert systematic political, economic, and diplomatic pressure against Arab ruling autocrats and force them to be attentive to their citizens' aspirations. This complex multilateral approach would produce the desired effects much more effectively than military preemption à la Iraq.   The United States must also recognize that actions speak louder than words, and that institution building requires the resolution of simmering regional conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, and reducing the socio-economic inequities that breed militancy and extremism. Only then may this exceptional historical moment be translated into a concrete political reality, whereby the Muslim Middle East can undergo genuine democratic transformation.   (Fawaz A. Gerges holds the Christian A. Johnson Chair in Middle East and International Affairs at Sarah Lawrence College). © 2005 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization   April 24, 2005   "Achieving Long-term Political Change in the Middle East", by Dov S. Zakheim. (Arabic Media Internet Network)   There is a growing consensus worldwide that the Middle East may be on the verge of fundamental change. After years of bloodshed and political stagnation, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has recovered its lost momentum. The Cedar Revolution in Lebanon has, at a minimum, brought about Syrian force withdrawals at a pace greater than any Security Council Resolution was able to achieve. And elections in both Iraq and Palestine, as well as local elections in Saudi Arabia, have led many observers to hold out hope for a new wave of democracy to sweep the region.   All of the foregoing developments have only taken place in the past few months. For any of them truly to take root, more time has to pass. In the interim, any one of them can be reversed. After all, it is not the first time that the Peace Process generated hope among Israelis and Palestinians. Nor is it clear that Syria is truly prepared to loosen its grip on Lebanon. Various media reports indicate that Syria is already inserting new personnel into Lebanon to replace many of its former secret agents there.   For that matter, elections are not as alien to Middle East politics as some pundits have implied. Indeed, both Palestinians and Iraqis have held elections in the past, while many of the Gulf States have held elections at various times for various assemblies. Nor should it be forgotten that some elections, that took place lately, did not extend the franchise to women.   The key to achieving long-term political change in the region is not an instant recipe that can be conjured up in a matter of months. Instead it involves years of patiently nourishing civil society in all its forms, so as to give people a sense of unity and responsibility, as well as of political empowerment. Political parties are certainly important, but so too are professional associations, cultural associations, labor unions, educational associations and social welfare organizations. Empowering such groups would enable individuals to express their hopes and aspirations in a variety of fora that could then feed into the political process. Such groups could transcend the tribal, ethnic and regional allegiances as well as religious affiliations that form the current bedrock of Middle Eastern society and generally pose an obstacle to societal cohesion.   Civil society in all its forms need not, indeed should not, replace long-standing sources of identity for Middle Easterners. Certainly many Western pundits would like to see secular societies emerge in the Middle East. Yet in seeking such societies, these Westerners are guilty of Kiplingesque cultural imperialism. Just because they have chosen a secular lifestyle does not mean that the peoples of the Middle East must do the same. Indeed, even as Europe has become markedly more secular, the United States in particular has taken on a more religious hue. For Muslims, Islam is a way of life rather than a religion, a fact that Western secularists often simply cannot comprehend. Religious leaders therefore play a very different role in the Middle East than they do in the West, and western notions of pure church-state separation (which in any event overlook the role of European monarchs who nominally stand at the head of established state churches) simply are beside the point.   Nevertheless, while modernity is unlikely ever to substitute for Islam, it need not stand in opposition to it. Civil society can, in fact, provide an effective bridge between Islam, other religions in the region, and the rights and benefits that all freedom loving peoples seek for themselves. By subsuming religious, ethnic, tribal and regional identities within larger commonalities, civil society can identify and nourish needs that encompass nations as a whole and help to provide peaceful channels for the expression of societal aspirations.   A strong civil society is no guarantee of western-style democracy. But western democracy is not the only option for a system of free representative government. In particular, several states in East Asia practice a form of democracy that is quite different from its western namesake. In fact, representative government will and does vary in nature, style, and organization from region to region and from culture to culture. What all peoples share in common is the desire to worship, assemble, speak, earn a respectable living, and articulate their needs to their leaders freely and without fear.   Current developments in the Middle East are too recent to be called a trend toward realizing this desire for freedom. Achieving it will take time. Nevertheless, if the international community is generous in providing the material, moral and financial wherewithal so as to nurture the various elements of civil society throughout the Middle East, the timeline of progress could be significantly foreshortened. And everyone, not only the people of the region, will benefit if that occurs.   (Dov S. Zakheim is a Board Member of Search for Common Ground).   © 2005 Arabic Media Internet Network - Internews Middle East
	European Human Rights Commissioner attacks Russia's Rights by Moscow News / The Moscow Times Russia   21/4/2005   Europe’s top human rights watchdog urged Russia on Wednesday to do more to protect press freedoms, punish soldiers who commit serious crimes in Chechnya, and halt a rise in anti-Semitism and racist attacks.   The Council of Europe’s commissioner for human rights, Alvaro Gil-Robles, has also called on Russia to abolish the death penalty, in his annual report on respect for human rights in the Russian Federation to the Committee of Ministers states.    He stressed that non-ratification of a 1997 protocol on the abolition of the death penalty within the European Convention on Human Rights is “a serious breach of the undertakings” Russia gave when it joined the Council. The penalty is still stipulated in Russian law, despite a moratorium being introduced in 1996 by former President Boris Yeltsin.   Gil-Robles also suggested that the Russian government should devise legislation to deter radical political leaders from venting expressions of xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism. He said there had been a disturbing a rise in Russia of anti-Semitic attacks, homophobia, and discrimination against people from the Caucasus. “Attacks on synagogues, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries and assaults against individuals are examples of the serious criminal acts which are becoming more frequent in numerous regions of the Russian Federation,” Reuters quoted the official.   In the commissioner’s opinion, the terrorist attack on a school in Beslan that led to the deaths of 330 people is “clearly racist in nature”. Russian authorities were not responsible for the tragedy, he claims. Only the terrorists and those people who backed should be called to account for such actions.   The report also pays particular attention to the administration of justice, police behavior, prison conditions, the respect for human rights within the armed forces, freedom of the press, the rights of national and religious minorities, the enjoyment of social rights, the activity of NGOs and human rights institutions, and the situation of vulnerable groups such as children, women, the elderly and the disabled in the context of the recent social reform.    A whole chapter deals with human rights in Chechnya. Gil-Robles said the situation in the republic, where separatist rebels have been fighting Russian troops for six years, had begun to improve over the past year but people continued to disappear there. While criminal groups and Chechen fighters were behind some of the disappearances, Russian forces and the Chechen police also appeared to be implicated, the report said. “Such practices must cease and those responsible, whoever they are, must be arrested and tried,” the report said.   Russia needs to adopt a law defining regional ombudsmen’s powers more clearly and strengthen dialogue and co-operation with civil society to establish a so-called “genuine modern democracy,” the commissioner concluded.   ©MosNews   20.07.2004   "Russia's image problem begins at Home", by Andrew Kuchins.  (The Moscow Times)   I arrived in Moscow a year ago under the illusion that after a traumatic decade Russia was stabilizing, becoming more predictable, maybe even rebounding. While the past year has been extraordinarily interesting intellectually, thoughts of stability and predictability must once again be set aside, if only for a time. In fact, there has been so much negative news that friends now say to me: "Gee, Andy, it seems like ever since you arrived in Russia the place has gone downhill." Just for the record, I acknowledge the coincidence but not the causal link between the two.   The Yukos case and the jailing of Mikhail Khodorkovsky have been on the front pages now for nearly a year, and while the endgame is near, the final result is not known. But it does seem that even if the company, recently Russia's largest and acknowledged to be one of its best, is not bankrupted, it will cease to exist in its present form. The most positive thing one can say is that this is a case of very selective justice, but for now the dark cloud of possible further deoligarchization blocks much of the sunlight of Russia's fabulous macroeconomic story.   A series of terrorist attacks in Moscow and elsewhere have rocked our sense of stability and security. And the brutal murder of the talented journalist Paul Klebnikov on July 9 brings back the memories of Russia 10 years ago, when the country was rife with gangland slayings and criminals ran rampant. President Vladimir Putin is right that Russia has an image problem, but it is not the making of an international conspiracy of Russophobes posing as philanthropists, nor is it something that a more energetic diplomatic corps can cure. It is a reality that Russians have made.   While I am not one to idealize the 1990s in Russia as some kind of democratic utopia, the clear erosion of democratic principles and open society that has taken place over the past four years has badly tarnished Russia's image. The parliamentary and presidential election cycle this past year was a textbook case of a managed democratic spetsoperatsiya, or special operation. Putin is genuinely popular, but the legitimacy of his re-election was marred by the Kremlin's heavy-handed tactics and the lack of any serious opposition. Russia now has a more compliant parliament, but it also has a much higher representation of nationalist conservatives and no liberal-democratic parties. The nascent multiparty system is badly damaged. There are no longer any independent national television stations. Who knows if there will be anything worth watching next fall after the demise of popular current affairs shows like "Svoboda Slova," "Namedni" and "Lichny Vklad"? Civil society remains weak and intimidated by arrests, harassment and other recent measures.   In order to stave off despair and the urge to simply return to the United States, I must step back and look at recent events in a broader historical perspective. This leads me to four points. The first is that this is not the Soviet Union and we are not returning to that. While democracy and open society in Russia have suffered some setbacks recently, if we consider where the country was 20 years ago, what has happened since that time is truly remarkable. Back then, people were debating whether the Soviet Union was totalitarian or authoritarian. Today the debate is whether Russia is a quasi-democracy or a semi-authoritarian state. In 1983, the late Ronald Reagan labeled the Soviet Union an "evil empire." Having lived here in the early 1980s I would agree that it was a pretty threatening and nasty place. While Russia may be flexing its muscles in the weak states on its periphery, we are very far from the evil empire days.   The second point is that even in the best-case scenario, the conventional wisdom when the Soviet Union collapsed was that a successful transformation into a market democracy was at least a two-generation project. Looking back at other revolutions and transformations, these are rarely linear processes. There are ups and downs along the way, or in terms of revolution, periods of reaction or Thermidors. Many features of Russia today suggest a reaction against the revolutionary period of the 1990s. How long-lived it will be is an open question.   My third point gives me more optimism about the future. Nearly all mature democracies are based on a large and enfranchised middle class that has rights and stakes they will defend against other entities, including an overbearing and avaricious state. The current Russian socioeconomic structure does not provide a solid foundation for democracy. At most, the middle class comprises 20 percent of the population; more than 40 percent barely get by, while more than 30 percent live below the poverty line. Then you have a very thin layer of super-rich that comprise no more than 1 percent of the population, but they account for the proliferation of luxury cars on the streets. In fact, the streets of Moscow offer a fairly accurate reflection of class structure: You see quite a few luxury cars and hordes of aging domestic models, but relatively few middle-class cars. The good news is that the middle class in Russia is steadily growing. Perhaps by the 2011-12 election cycle, Russia's socioeconomic structure will be more conducive to democracy.   My final point is a reality check on our expectations. At present, Russia is a relatively normal middle-income country. With a per capita GDP of around $2,500, we should not compare it with wealthy democracies like those in Western Europe, or the United States or Japan. A more apt comparison set for Russia now includes countries like Argentina, Mexico and Brazil. Middle-income countries are not typically mature democracies, and they are more prone to economic booms and busts. They do typically have weak legal systems, high levels of corruption and less free media.   Putin has set an ambitious goal for Russia to grow rapidly from a middle-income country to a low-end developed economy with a per capita income matching that of Portugal. But in order to sustain high growth levels to meet this worthy goal, he will need to address the legal, political and social weaknesses of middle-income countries that Russia shares. The question of property rights must be resolved once and for all. The judicial branch of government must be made more independent. The transparency and effectiveness of government and business will be improved by strong and independent media and civil society. Diversifying the economy from such high dependence on natural resources will also help sustain growth in the long term, as well as promote a prosperous middle class. All of this will, of course, take time and focused effort. So despite negative trends today, while I am packing my bags, it is only for a vacation, and I look forward to returning to Moscow to see how Putin turns things around in his second term. In current-day Russia, it is principally his responsibility to improve the image of Russia, not that of his diplomats.
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