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	Turkmenbashi, President for Life by Peter Lloyd ABC News: Foreign Correspondent Turkmenistan   Broadcast: 21/06/2005. (Transcript)   It’s the changing of the guard in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan’s capital. Looming large over the soldiers is the towering figure of Turkmenbashi, the self-styled great leader of all Turkmen. In the 13 years since the country declared its independence from the Soviet Union, Turkmenbashi, or Saparmurat Niyazov, to use his real name, has seen his statues and portraits dominate every public space in town. They make one thing clear, there’ll be no changing of the political guard in Ashgabat, Turkmenbashi has declared himself President for life.   Ashgabat, it’s Arabic, it means the city of love. But here in Turkmenistan what it really means is an all powerful president who’s in love, not so much with his country or his people, but himself. For the great Turkmenbashi has built a one-party state, based on a bizarre cult of personality. In public, ordinary Turkmens will proclaim their devotion to their leader but their affection is contrived, motivated by a climate of fear and intimidation. Celebration is the key to their survival, but that makes ordinary Turkmens mere bid players in a perverse presidential pantomime.   For the western media, the opportunities to visit Turkmenistan are few and far between and those of us granted the dubious privilege are subjected to an endless stream of propaganda. Not so long ago, these goose-stepping soldiers would have sworn allegiance to far away Moscow – now they take orders from just one man.   Every year a sort of people’s parliament of hand-picked cronies is convened to give President Niyazov a collective pat on the back.   MALE SPEAKER: My great leader you are the incarnation of justice, you are the magic crystal, you are the great visionary.   LLOYD: Speakers compete to see who can lavish the most praise upon the President.   FEMALE SPEAKER: We, oh beloved father, great Turkmenbashi, fully approve your wise domestic and foreign policy.   LLOYD: It’s a shameless display of state-sanctioned sycophancy.   PRESIDENT NIYAZOV: The bird of happiness can sit on the head of one man, which means the bird of happiness can sit on the head of the whole Turkmen people.   LLOYD: Ministers are required to stand in the wings and take notes. Laws are passed on a whim and a presidential wave. Turkmenistan television dedicates itself to pumping out pictures of the President and political propaganda. Overseeing the broadcast are television executives who also know how to flatter.   BAHAR MURKHIEVA – EXECUTIVE, TURKMENISTAN TV: Our President is a magnificent expert in history and I would not be wrong if I called him our teacher.   LLOYD: The “teacher” is fond of using the people’s parliament to issue bizarre edicts, mostly bans. It’s forbidden to mention AIDS, have gold dental crowns, perform ballet or wear make-up on television. The President thinks presenters are already pretty enough, and who are TV executives to disagree.   BAHAR MURKHIEVA – EXECUTIVE, TURKMENISTAN TV: Traditionally Turkmen and women are distinct with their natural attractiveness so they rely on their natural beauty, their natural voice. What can be more beautiful?   LLOYD: During our visit, we have constant companions. A burly government minder and a tour guide to show us around.   TOUR GUIDE: At the top of the arch of neutrality there is the statue of Mr President.   LLOYD: A statue, which always rotates to face the sun. Ashgabat is little more than a dictator’s Disneyland. And what makes this city all the more surreal is the fact that so few people actually live in it, most of the four and a half million people live in rural Turkmenistan, beyond those hills. But it’s a select few who have the President’s permission to be seen and heard.   Just beyond the capital we meet the President’s good friend and acclaimed national hero – farm boss, Muratberi Sopyev.   MURATBERI SOPYEV: All Turkmen respect him, love him. He works day and night for them. He enjoys the deepest trust of the people. He is respected and loved by the people.   LLOYD: Muratberi Sopyev takes us to meet what he says is a typical family. The camel has stage fright, offering up no milk but in the presence of the village chieftain, the old woman spouts the party line.   OLD WOMAN: Life since independence is better than before.   LLOYD: After a brief encounter, the government minder decides the family is suddenly very busy.   GOVERNMENT MINDER: Let’s go.   LLOYD: So we drive to another house where a banquet awaits.   HEAD OF HOUSE: After independence, I bought a car and a truck.   LLOYD: The head of the house, yet another enthusiastic supporter of President Niyazov.   HEAD OF HOUSE: In 2003 I got a tractor as a reward when the Great Leader distributed tractors to those who worked hard.   LLOYD: The farmer’s daughter recites a verse she’s been learning at school from a book written by a self-styled poet and philosopher, none other than Niyazov himself.   It goes by the name Ruhknama, a giant version ceremonially opens every night in Ashgabat. In this supposedly secular Muslim nation, it is the new Koran, Niyazov’s spiritual guide for the people. In schools, it’s taught almost as theology. Children are expected to learn passages and so does anyone who wants to get a driver’s license.   The cult of personality cultivated here extends to putting Niyazov up there with God. This three-storey high all marble mosque has just been built in his hometown. It’s one of the world’s largest accommodating up to 25,000 worshipers at one time. Along with phrases from the Koran, the exterior wall is plastered with Niyazov’s favourite lines from the Ruhknama. The building is also modestly named.   There’s plenty more slogans inside proclaiming the greatness of Turkmenbashi but our cameras can’t go in because the Imam says he needs the permission of the President himself. Now this is one cleric who’s not about to go around defying his earthly boss. His predecessor, the last Imam of Turkmenistan, is now serving a 22 year sentence for refusing to preach the Ruhknama in the mosque.   Niyazov has put his design inspiration on many other buildings around Ashgabat, like the magnificent edifice that is the national museum.   OWEZMUHAMMED MAMMETNUROW – NATIONAL MUSEUM DIRECTOR: Naturally the chief designer of the city is President Turkmenbashi the Great. His thoughts go along the lines of the best thoughts of the greatest architects of the modern time.   LLOYD: Pride of place among the nation’s treasures, is a giant carpet, a smaller one features the replica of an old bank note showing the President before he went prematurely black. [Niyazov’s hair] While Niyazov’s busy rewriting his country’s history, this is all that’s left of old Nissa, one of the capitals of the Parthian kings from the third century BC. But it’s not Turkmenistan’s archaeological sites that are of special interest to the present ruler.   For President Niyazov, what really matters is beneath Turkmenistan’s deserts, it’s vast reserves of oil and natural gas worth tens of billions of dollars and all of it under the President’s personal control. Very little of this wealth trickles down to ordinary Turkmen and women, most of whom live in poverty and without jobs. The country is regarded as having one of the lowest life expectancy rates here in the region.   Of course these kinds of people are largely invisible to outsiders, to tourists and foreign media alike. Government minders restrict most visitors to the Orwellian splendours of Ashgabat and besides even if people did want to complain, the chances are they wouldn’t for fear of retribution.   DAVID LEWIS – POLITICAL ANALYST: He is brutal and violent. He’s a leader who has used a whole range of methods against the political opponents. Sometimes he has been happy to force them into exile, sometimes he’s used long terms of imprisonment, sometimes he’s used even more severe methods.   LLOYD: David Lewis can be critical of President Niyazov but from a distance. Today he’s in London. Until recently he was the Central Asia Director of the International Crisis Group, an institute for political analysis.   DAVID LEWIS – POLITICAL ANALYST: He’s clearly a largely paranoid leader, he has very strange sort of behavioural patterns, he’s very dictatorial in his style, in behaviour and very untrusting of anybody around him.   Click on the link below to access the rest of this article. Visit the related web page
	The Asia Challenge: Changing the Face of Global Politics by Fei-Ling Wang / Richard N. Haass / Eleanor Hall IHT / ABC News Online   19 July, 2005   "China rising", by Fei-Ling Wang. (International Herald Tribune)   The ever-growing economic power of China poses important questions: will China, despite its lack of freedom, become a true world-class power? And if and when it does, how should the international community respond?   With 760 million laborers, an average wage that is a small fraction of America's, and one of the highest savings rates in the world (38 percent to 42 percent, though much of this is wasted by the dysfunctional Chinese banking system), China has enjoyed annual economic growth of 9 percent for the last quarter-century.   The Central Intelligence Agency, using the purchasing power parity method, ranks the Chinese gross domestic product as the second largest in the world, about 62 percent of the American and 1.94 times Japan's, the third largest.   Yet Beijing has yet to forcefully claim the title of world leader.   There are two possible reasons. First, China is actually still poor and weak. About two-thirds of the Chinese population is systematically excluded from the glittering, vibrant urban centers and have the low living standard typical of a developing nation. While China's most developed regions, Shanghai and Beijing, were ranked by the United Nations in 2001 as equivalent to Greece and Singapore, the more populous provinces, like Gansu and Guizhou, were ranked with Haiti and Sudan.   China is essentially still a giant labor-intensive processing factory. Among the great variety of industrial goods China now produces and exports, few are invented or designed by Chinese. As a result, the Chinese end up earning low wages at great costs to their environment, while foreign patent holders, investors and retailers capture the lion's share of the profit. No wonder foreign capitalists are among the most enthusiastic cheerleaders of China's rise.   Second, China's foreign policy is still motivated by a besieged one-party regime's desire for preservation. The persistent abuse of human rights and systematic suppression of freedom show how paranoid the regime is.   Many of China's business leaders hold or seek foreign passports or residency. Capital flight from China has been surpassing foreign direct investment since the late 1990's. Beijing's top diplomatic objective has been to gain external acceptance that will prop up the regime, not to expand Chinese national interests or exercise power abroad.   This profound divorce of the regime's political interest from the nation's interest, of course, could easily change: Beijing could quickly become a typical rising challenger or even an imperialist power if it feels secure and powerful enough; the regime could also be aggressive and belligerent if it feels desperately weak and in danger of collapse.   Therefore, predictions that China will quickly become a world power, and will do so peacefully, are premature. Since the late 19th century, only one major non-Western nation, Japan, has risen to become a world-class power, and it did so only by wreaking much havoc.   Still, China should and can be powerful and rich. More important, the Chinese people deserve to be free: free from poverty and backwardness, free from the hurtful feelings of past humiliations, free from deeply trenched ethnocentrism and chauvinism, and free from political tyranny. Such a rise of China would enrich the world and truly glorify Chinese history.   Chinese people and the world must work together to devise and further social, political and institutional changes, in addition to promoting economic development, to ensure the peaceful rise of China.   It is also obviously premature to assume that China's rise necessarily threatens the United States. Such a belief may become an enormously costly self-fulfilling prophecy. It is morally dubious to suppress the Chinese, a fifth of the human race, just because the government there is now undemocratic. It will take much more than devising some clever geopolitical moves to check and control China or to force a quick regime change in Beijing.   What is needed from the current world leaders is serious commitment, long-term goals, and steady leadership and coordination to help China rise and change, peacefully. The success or failure of China's rise are too consequential to be left for Beijing to manage alone.   (Fei-Ling Wang is a professor of international affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology and an international affairs fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.)   June 14, 2005   "What to do about China", by Richard N. Haass. (U.S. News & World Report,)   A good deal of history is determined by relations between and among great powers. The 21st century promises to be no different. The most critical relationship will be that between the United States, today's dominant power, and China, the world's rising power. And have no doubt about it, China is rising. China's gross domestic product is roughly half that of the United States, but in three decades, the total value of the goods and services it produces should be about the same. China is also converting some of its wealth into military might. It now boasts the third-largest military budget in the world.   At the same time, it is important not to exaggerate China's accomplishments. Income per capita is less than $ 5,000. China's leaders understand that the country requires a generation or more of peace and stability so that it can focus on economic growth and help its hundreds of millions of poor people.   Still, foreign policy "realists," citing history, argue that China will inevitably challenge American primacy and that it is a question of "when" and not "if" the U.S.-China relationship turns competitive or worse. Their conclusion? The United States should seek to prevent China's rise.   One problem with this thinking is that the rise and fall of countries is largely beyond the ability of the United States or any other outsider to control. The performance of states is mostly the result of demographics, culture, natural resources, educational systems, economic policy, political stability, and foreign policy. It is not clear the United States could prevent China's rise even if it wanted to. But should the United States want to? The answer is no. For one thing, attempting to block China's rise would guarantee its animosity and all but ensure its working against U.S. interests around the world.   Test case. More important, the United States shouldn't want to discourage the rise of a strong China. America needs other countries to be strong if it is to have the partners it needs to meet the many challenges posed by globalization: the spread of nuclear weapons, terrorism, infectious diseases, drugs, and global climate change. The issue for American foreign policy shouldn't be whether China becomes strong but how China uses its growing strength.   Working with India, Japan, and others, our goal should be to integrate China into the international system, to make it a pillar of the global establishment. China is already working with the United States against terrorism, but the most pressing area for expanded cooperation is North Korea. The problem is that China isn't using its considerable economic ties with North Korea to pressure it to stop developing nuclear weapons. It needs to do more. The United States should also do more to change China's stance: by offering North Korea some attractive incentives to give up its nuclear materials and weapons, by reassuring China that if that happens, Washington will oppose the emergence of any new nuclear-weapons state in the region, and by underscoring that this is a test case for U.S.-China ties.   The other issue that could seriously hurt U.S.-China ties, or even bring the two powers into conflict, is Taiwan. Taiwan must be pressed not to take unilateral steps that would be tantamount to independence and risk a military response from the mainland. China needs to be reminded not to use force to unify the country. Neither China nor Taiwan should count on Washington standing aside if they change the status quo.   Yet another source of growing irritation is trade. China now exports to the United States some $ 160 billion more than it takes in. What's important is that U.S. exports to China enjoy fair access and that disputes are settled by the World Trade Organization. What we want to avoid is having trade becoming a source of friction rather than integration.   A final consideration is China's domestic politics. China is more open economically than politically and more open politically than it was a decade ago. But it has a long way to go. The best way to promote democratization is by bolstering the middle class, extending the rule of law, and limiting the role of the state. Such political evolution is crucial; as the lure of communism fades, it is important that nationalism not fill the political and ideological void.   This is easier said than done, of course. The rise of Chinese nationalism is a reminder of just how difficult it will be for America and China to reach an accommodation. A U.S.-China cold war would be costly, dangerous, and distracting, robbing attention and resources from pressing internal and global challenges. Both countries have a stake in avoiding this outcome; the course of this century will depend in no small part on whether they succeed.   (Richard N. Haass is the president of the US Council on Foreign Relations).   6 May , 2005   "The Asia Challenge: Changing the Face of Global Politics", by Eleanor Hall. (ABC News Online)   A distinguished Singaporean diplomat and former president of the United Nations Security Council has warned today that the course is set for military conflict between China and the United States unless the international community makes some fundamental changes. And he says Australia has a role to play.   Kishore Mahbubani is now Dean of the Lee Kwan Yew School of Public Policy at Singapore's National University and he is also the author of two provocative books on foreign policy, the first, Can Asians think? and the latest, published just last month, on the paradoxes of the US relationship with the world, called Beyond the Age of Innocence. Dean Mahbubani is in Australia this week to speak about foreign policy..   DEAN MAHBUBANI: The reason why I wrote the book that I did, Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding trust within America and the World, is because I fear that the divide is growing between America and Asia. And something should be done now, today, to stop this divide from becoming bigger and deeper.   ELEANOR HALL: What's the biggest risk of this divide?   DEAN MAHBUBANI: Well, there are at least two big divides that could emerge. One is of course within America and the Islamic world, and the Islamic world of course is very prevalent in our region.   And the other is within America and China. And with both these relationships, America's at a significant crossroads. So what it does today, what we do today, will in a sense decide how the future, the first half of the 21st century, will evolve.   ELEANOR HALL: So you’re saying America has a moment now to take a decision to go one way or the other?   DEAN MAHBUBANI: That's right.   ELEANOR HALL: What are the two choices confronting it?   DEAN MAHBUBANI: Well, I think in the case of China the choice is very clear. In the case of China the choice is whether or not America accepts the re-emergence of China as a major power, and creates a global environment in which China can function, in a sense as a normal great power.   By the way, I should, to be fair, also emphasise the choice lies with China too. China's got to decide what kind of great power it's going to emerge as, you see. If you take extremes it could emerge, on the one hand, like the Soviet Union, as a great military power, set to try and dominate and expand. Or it could emerge like a civilian power in the way that Germany and Japan re-emerged after World War II.   So those are the two extreme models, and we hope, and that seems to be in any case, the declared intention of the Chinese Government, to emerge as a civilian power along the lines of Germany and Japan and to become… participate actively in the world trading economic environment as a constructive player.   ELEANOR HALL: And I presume the other divide is with the Islamic world?   DEAN MAHBUBANI: Yes. The other divide is with the Islamic world, and that's of course a much more difficult issue to handle, because you're not handling a single entity over there, but you're handling a single, growingly, a single consciousness in the Islamic world.   As you know, the attitudes towards America in the Islamic world, sadly, have become rather negative in the last few years, and this is a very unhealthy trend, and in some ways all of us are becoming victims also of this divide, because if you want to understand, for example, what happened in Bali, where sadly so many Australians and others lost their lives, this was not a struggle between Islam and Australia, this was a struggle within Islam and America in which the rest of us have become victims.   ELEANOR HALL: Australia has long had somewhat of an identity crisis over whether it's Asian or European – the geography or history argument. Do you have any advice on this for the current generation of Australian decision-makers?   DEAN MAHBUBANI: I think… my hope is that Australia will not agonize over this dilemma but actually enjoy this dilemma, because in a sense you have the potential to enjoy the best of both worlds.   I mean, the Western heritage is a great gift that Australia has. Its geographical location in Asia is another great gift that it has.   So it can take full advantage of both cultural universes, and try and see what it can do to be a constructive player in bringing together these two cultures, which by the way have been separated now for several centuries, and which are now coming together on a level playing field.   And that's going to create a new burst of creativity, give a new burst of dynamism, to the world, and here Australia's on the frontlines and can take full advantage of this.   ELEANOR HALL: Now you've written that by 2050 Asian societies will make up 90 per cent of the world's population. How do you see that impacting on international power politics?   DEAN MAHBUBANI: I don't think it's 90 per cent, it's probably closer to 55 or 60 per cent. I don't have the figures offhand.   But, I mean, it's clear if you look at the populations of Europe, the population of Europe is not going to grow, the population of North America will grow slightly, but the largest part of the world's population will be in Asia still.   And in 1820 Asia had three fifths of the world's population, and three fifths of the world's GNP. When you come to 1920 Asia still had three fifths of the world's population and one fifth or less of the world's GNP.   What you are going to see by 2020-2025 is that the Asians will recover their normal share of the global GNP, and when that happens, when Asians have three fifths of the global GNP, it's inevitable that the role and influence of Asian countries has to be accommodated in the global system, and the tragedy here is that the global system is not yet preparing for the re-emergence of Asia.   ELEANOR HALL: How should the global system prepare for that?   DEAN MAHBUBANI: Let me give you a fairly simple and elementary example. The two most powerful international financial institutions are the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.   Now, as a result of an understanding reached in 1945, the head of the IMF traditionally is a European and the head of the World Bank traditionally is an American. And it's good that very good distinguished candidates are found each time to lead these organisations. As you know, James Wolfensohn has been an excellent head of the World Bank.   But now with Asians in a sense assuming a greater and greater share of the world's economic and financial space, it seems rather strange that no Asian is qualified to lead either the IMF or the World Bank.   This is the sort of change that has to come, and it's better for the IMF and the World Bank to announce that in future candidates can come from any corner of the world, and a qualified Asian or a qualified Australian.   ELEANOR HALL: Now you've had a long association with the United Nations over your years as a diplomat, including two stints as President of the Security Council. The United Nations is at the moment at a stage where it's trying to reform. Do you think that reform will work, or are you pessimistic about the future of the United Nations as a vehicle for the future you'd like to see?   DEAN MAHBUBANI: Well, you caught me in a very awkward position, because in public I'm always… I'm bound to be optimistic about UN reform, but in private, and this is a strange thing to say on radio, I tend to be less optimistic, because I'm acutely aware of the forces that resist change in these areas.   ELEANOR HALL: In that sense then, you're saying that the world has a choice of either reforming and adapting to the rise of Asian powers, or basically acquiescing and having major wars. Are you predicting that there will be major wars in this century?   DEAN MAHBUBANI: Well I'm hoping very much that there'll be no major wars. But I think the problem that we face is that everybody seems to think – and this is the biggest limitation of our world today – is that if we just stick to autopilot, keep doing things the way we were doing things before, then the world will carry on and smoothly change and transform itself. That's not the way history works.   When great changes come you have to adapt to great changes, and I hope that we will be, this time around, intelligent enough, wise enough, to avoid conflicts when new powers emerge.
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