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	John Bolton"s Broken World by Robert Kuttner / Rosa Brooks Boston Globe / New York Times   June 29, 2005   "Bolton endgame", by Robert Kuttner. (The Boston Globe)   The bitterly contentious nomination of John Bolton to be UN ambassador comes to a showdown this holiday weekend.   With the Senate having twice refused to break a filibuster over Bolton, President Bush may use his power to make a recess appointment during Congress"s Fourth of July break. Bolton would then serve without Senate confirmation until the next Congress ends, in late 2006.   Or Bush could withdraw Bolton"s name.   Bolton"s views on the UN are hostile. He is known as a short-tempered martinet. He got poor reviews for his last job as undersecretary of state for arms control. For instance, Bolton was a skeptic of a US joint program to keep Russian nuclear fuel from reaching terrorists. The effort was tied up in legal minutiae during Bolton"s tenure, but soon after Bolton"s departure early in 2005, the logjam was broken and agreement with Russia reached.   The Washington Post reported that our allies so distrust Bolton on the sensitive negotiations over Iran"s nuclear program that they made sure to exclude him from high-level meetings in Washington last January.   More ominously, Bolton is suspected of using ultra-secret National Security Agency wiretaps to snoop on rivals in the intelligence and defense community. Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee led by Senator Joe Biden of Delaware demanded to know the names of people on whom Bolton requested wiretapped information. For anything but legitimate national security purposes, this use would violate US law. But the White House has stonewalled this request, intensifying Democrats opposition.   As the Senate debated Bolton, Senator Pat Roberts, a Kansas Republican, declared that a recess appointment "would weaken not only Mr. Bolton but also the United States," but he soon recanted, very likely after some prodding. His first impulse was right. This recess appointment would insult both Republicans and Democrats in the Senate, and the institution itself.   Bolton would be serving for less than 18 months. He would not be taken seriously by other diplomats. The House recently passed a resolution withholding half the US dues contribution to the UN, pending reforms. Even the Bush administration opposes this heavy-handed ploy. Given Bolton"s own extreme views and volcanic temperament, he is about the last person to negotiate the delicate domestic and international politics of shoring up the UN.   Bolton dearly wanted to be deputy secretary of state. But Condoleezza Rice, who has appointed diplomatic professionals to all the senior posts at State, made sure that would not happen. One well-placed source suggests that Bolton had to be talked into taking the UN job, presumably by Vice President Cheney, his close ideological ally. Bolton would be the last neocon in a senior post.   Bush"s behavior suggests that Bolton himself might not want to take the job under a cloud. After the Senate GOP leader, Bill Frist, declared that he lacked the votes to break a filibuster, Bush summoned Frist to the White House and told him to try again.   In a humiliation for Frist, the Republican leadership on June 21 mustered only 54 votes, three fewer than on the first attempt and six less than required, with George Voinovich of Ohio voting no. Some observers ask: Why would Bush make this desperation move if the White House and Bolton were willing to use a recess appointment all along? But Bush may plow ahead anyway.   It is ironic that Bush may run roughshod over the legislature, on the very holiday that celebrates our liberty, and at a time when we are urging fledging democracies to protect minority rights.   The Constitution provided the recess appointment prerogative mainly for emergencies before there were year-round sessions of Congress, when senators traveled to Washington by horse and buggy. In modern times, recess appointments are infrequent, usually made when Congress is out of session, almost never over a short holiday break.   This nomination can"t win Senate approval because of Bolton"s own extremism. It is the latest case of Bush overreaching in his second term.   Like the faltering Social Security initiative, another emblematic Bush overreach, the Bolton nomination also produced rare Democratic discipline and unity. It stimulated a lot of citizen activism, including a campaign by 102 former senior diplomats opposed to Bolton, mostly appointees of Republicans Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush I.   John Bolton is damaged goods. If he does take the UN job without the Senate"s blessing, Bush"s victory will be Pyrrhic.   June 13, 2005   "John Bolton"s Broken World", by Rosa Brooks. (NYT)   Despite his well-earned reputation as a bully and a blowhard, John Bolton, the guy who says "it is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law," seems poised to become the next U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Anyone who doesn"t see why Bolton"s attitude is disastrously mistaken should picture his first days as ambassador in a world where no one grants any validity to international law.   First, Ambassador Bolton is surely going to want whip all those foreign diplomats into shape. Particularly the French, with their foie gras and snooty "Je-told-you-so" attitude about Iraq. So maybe he will start by sending a letter summoning the French ambassador back to New York from the Riviera. But, oops! Bolton would have a hard time sending his letter, because in a world where no one grants the validity of international law, why would the French abide by the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union and related protocols? That"s the treaty that pledges nations to deliver mail with foreign stamps. Without it, foreign postal officials would toss U.S. letters into the trash.   So, no letter to the French ambassador. Fine! Bolton can focus instead on the Germans, who are also a real pain in the butt, what with their insistence on taking the human rights high road to make up for their Nazi past. Bolton could pay a visit to Germany, spreading the good news about U.S. dominance — I mean, uh, leadership — and reminding the Germans about the Marshall Plan.   Except that it would be hard for him to get anywhere if no one respected the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944. That"s the treaty that permits overflights of sovereign airspace. Without it, sovereign states would be free to shoot down any foreign planes appearing overhead. So maybe Bolton"s plane would be forced down over, say, Croatia. Now, it"s fair to say the Croatians probably wouldn"t be amused at a violation of their airspace, especially given that little misunderstanding they had with the U.S. a few years ago. Bolton might not recall it — after all, there were so many little misunderstandings, with so many little countries. But the Croatians still remember how, under Bolton"s leadership, the U.S. suspended foreign aid to Croatia (and other allies) just because Croatia wouldn"t promise not to turn U.S. war crimes suspects over to the International Criminal Court. So perhaps the Croatians would arrest Bolton.   Of course, as an ambassador, Bolton could try to claim diplomatic immunity. But in a world where no one accepts the validity of international law, Croatia would feel free to ignore the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Naturally, Bolton would demand that the U.S. consul be informed of his arrest, but because the Croatians would be using their copy of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as toilet paper, he"d be out of luck there too.   Bolton would just have to wait for the Marines to rescue him. They could — after all, isn"t the U.S. still the preeminent global military power? And even with all our recruiting woes (oops, that Iraq problem again) we ought to have a few guys left who could be spared for such a mission. Still, these things take time, so Bolton would have to cool his heels for a while. Maybe his jailers would let him watch CNN. But, uh-oh, no satellite communications without the U.N. Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting!   OK. OK. You get the idea. Although many Americans associate "international law" with controversial issues such as disarmament treaties or the International Criminal Court, the overwhelming bulk of international law has to do with the mundane but essential ways in which nations cooperate to make life possible in our interconnected world. And if Bolton really believes that international law is a dangerous evil, he has no business serving as ambassador to the U.N. He should head back to law school for a little refresher course instead.   To be fair, Bolton is also famous for remarking that "there is no such thing as the United Nations." So maybe he"s only interested in the ambassadorship because he sees it as the next best thing to retirement.   Of course, if what Bolton really wants is early retirement, the Senate could just give it to him.   (Rosa Brooks, is an associate professor at the University of Virginia School of Law)
	US 'Realists' press for Bush to engage Iran, North Korea by Jim Lobe Inter Press Service   Washington, June 3, 2005   Hawks in the administration of US President George W. Bush may think that they are tough, but their dreams of ''regime change'' in Iran and North Korea are increasingly deluded, not to say dangerous, according to their hard-edged realist rivals who have become increasingly outspoken in recent weeks.   Their latest broadside comes in the form of an article by Richard Haass, president of the influential Council on Foreign Relations, in the forthcoming edition of the journal Foreign Affairs entitled ''The Limits of Regime Change.''   Haass, who served under Bush in a top State Department position, also has just published a new book, 'The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course', one of the central themes of which is that the hawks have over-estimated Washington's ability to change the world.   Haass' article and book release follow the publication of a column last week by arch-realist Brent Scowcroft in the Wall Street Journal which argues that the hawks' rejection of bilateral talks with North Korea in the hopes that the government there will collapse are ''irresponsible.''   Yet another realist, former Foreign Affairs editor Fareed Zakaria, made much the same argument in a recent Newsweek column that assailed the White House for what he called a four-year ''stalemate'' within the administration between hawks who ''want to push for regime change'' in North Korea and ''pragmatists'' who ''want to end the North's nuclear programme.''   Common to all three authors is the conviction that the U.S. is not all-powerful; that it must coordinate its policy with other great powers to achieve its ends; that creative diplomacy can be far more constructive than military action; and that, despite the tough rhetoric of administration hawks, U.S. policy towards Iran and North Korea, both members of Bush's ''axis of evil'', effectively is adrift.   The realist offensive comes amid a growing sense that the intra-administration fights between hawks led by Vice President Dick Cheney and realists led by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell have continued unabated nearly six months into Bush's second term, albeit more recently without Powell and fewer leaks from unhappy State Department and intelligence officers who generally lined up with the realists.   While Washington has persisted in its refusal to directly engage either Iran or North Korea, it has provided nominal, if sceptical, support to negotiations between the so-called EU-3 -- Germany, Britain and France -- and Iran on Teheran's nuclear programme while also stating that a military option of one kind or another remains on the table if an agreement is not reached.   Washington also has continued to insist that Pyongyang return to the Six-Party Talks -- which also involve China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia -- to discuss a possible agreement for dismantling its nuclear programme.   But the administration has rejected entreaties by China and South Korea, in particular, to put on the table what it might be prepared to offer if the North were to strike such a deal. In recent weeks, Washington also has sent 17 Stealth warplanes to South Korea as part of a series of steps to increase pressure on the North and signal the other parties that its patience is running out.   Haass, who, as head of the influential Policy Planning office in the State Department during the first two years of the Bush administration, was a top adviser to Powell, argues in his Foreign Affairs article, that the hawks' pursuit of regime change is flawed on many counts.   He concedes that regime change appears superficially attractive because it ''is less distasteful than diplomacy and less dangerous than living with new nuclear states.''   ''There is only one problem,'' he adds. ''It is highly unlikely to have the desired effect soon enough.''   Haass dismisses the notion that Washington is prepared to invade either country simply due to the ''enormous'' expense involved, the ability of Pyongyang's conventional military power to inflict destruction on South Korea and U.S. forces stationed there, and the size and large population of Iran that would make ''any occupation costly, miserable, and futile.''   In addition, ''regime replacement,'' often is far more difficult and expensive than the initial regime ouster, as Washington's experience in Iraq has demonstrated, according to Haass.   As for the option of carrying out a military attack on Pyongyang's or Teheran's nuclear sites, as urged by some hard-line circles outside the administration, Haass warns that, given the state of U.S. intelligence on the two countries' nuclear programmes, this is likely to be limited in its effectiveness and would almost certainly prove strategically counterproductive.   In the first place, Washington is unlikely to face a demonstrable imminent threat from either country that would justify pre-emptive action. Any preventive attack on North Korea would be opposed by Washington's Six-Party partners because of the dangers posed by war on the Korean Peninsula, according to Haass.   While a preventive attack on Iranian targets could set back its nuclear programme by months or years, he argues, Teheran could respond in any number of ways, from ''unleashing terrorism'' and promoting instability in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia, to triggering oil price increases that ''could trigger a global economic crisis.''   Instead, Haass urges what he terms a ''containment'' policy similar to that pursued by Washington during the Cold War which, he notes, had as a ''second, subordinate goal'' incremental regime change or ''regime evolution.'' Such a policy, he says, ''tends to be indirect and gradual and to involve the use of foreign policy tools other than military force.''   ''A foreign policy that chooses to integrate, not isolate, despotic regimes can be the Trojan horse that moderates their behavior in the short run and their nature in the long run,'' he writes.   Critical to this strategy is Washington's willingness to offer clear incentives, ''including economic assistance, security assurances, and greater political standing,'' to both countries if they satisfied U.S. and international concerns regarding their nuclear programmes. It also would spell out clear penalties, including military attack ''in the most dire circumstances,'' if they failed to cooperate, says Haass.   Washington also should work with its negotiating partners to devise packages for both countries that lay out similar carrots and sticks on which all parties would commit themselves, he adds.   He admits it is quite possible this strategy will not work, and that one or both countries will use the time to build up their nuclear capabilities either overtly or covertly. The option then is to accept their de facto nuclear status similar to that currently accepted for Israel, India, and Pakistan.   Given the stakes that would be involved, particularly the likelihood that the two countries' neighbours would try to follow suit, Washington, according to Haass should declare publicly that any government that uses or threatens to use weapons of mass destruction or knowingly transfers them to third parties ''opens itself up to the strongest reprisals, including attack and removal from power.'' At the same time, the U.S. should try to persuade all other major powers to sign on to such a policy, he adds.
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