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	Landslide win for Tehran mayor in Iranian president poll by IHT / Reuters / AP Iran   June 25, 2005.   "Landslide win for Tehran mayor in Iranian president poll". (Reuters)   Ultra-conservative Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has swept to a landslide win in presidential elections, spelling a possible end to Iran's fragile social reforms and tentative rapprochement with the West.   Mr Ahmadinejad, 48, received the backing of the religious poor to defeat moderate cleric Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was supported by pro-reform parties and wealthy Iranians fearful of a hardline monopoly on power in the Islamic state.   "The figures show that Ahmadinejad is the winner," Interior Ministry spokesman Jahanbakhsh Khanjani told reporters.   He will be Iran's first non-cleric president for 24 years when he takes office in August.   An official at the Guardian Council, which must approve the election results, said that out of 24.8 million voted counted, Mr Ahmadinejad had won 61.7 per cent of ballots cast, defying pre-poll predictions of a tight race.   The official said turnout was 26 million, or 56 per cent, down on the 63 per cent of Iran's 46.7 million eligible voters who cast ballots in an inconclusive first round on June 17.   "It's over, we accept that we've lost," a close Rafsanjani aide, who asked not to be identified, told Reuters.   Although Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has the last word on all matters of state, a hardline presidency would remove the moderating influence on decision-making exercised by outgoing reformist President Mohammad Khatami since 1997.   "This all but closes the door for a breakthrough in US-Iran relations," said Karim Sadjadpour, Tehran-based analyst for the International Crisis Group.   Washington broke ties with Iran in 1980 and now accuses it of developing nuclear weapons and supporting terrorism. Iran, the world's fourth-largest oil producer, denies the charges.   28 June, 2005   "Iran's president-elect: A hard-liner, for a change", by Amin Saikal. (International Herald Tribune)   The triumph of the mayor of Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, over Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in the second round of the Iranian presidential election completes the conservative Islamists' takeover of all the branches of the Iranian government.   Given Ahmadinejad's ultra-conservative Islamic credentials, he can be expected to work in concert with Iran's unelected but powerful supreme spiritual and political leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, and his supporters, who dominate the legislature and judiciary as well as the security and armed forces.   Ahmadinejad is likely to follow a more restrictive Shiite Islamic path in his domestic and foreign policy dispositions than his two immediate predecessors, the outgoing President Mohammad Khatami, a reformist, and Rafsanajani, a pragmatist.   Ahmadinejad has promised to resist "Western decadence," to build a "powerful modern Islamic Iran" and to press on with Iran's nuclear program. These are not goals that will please Washington, which has already labeled Ahmadinejad's election a fraud.   Why did the Iranian voters turn to Ahmadinejad?   First, Rafsanjani did not have a very credible record with the Iranian electorate. He is a pragmatic conservative follower of the founder of the Iranian Islamic regime, Ayatollah Khomeini, and was Iran's president from 1989 to 1997, but over the years he has gained the reputation of being a political opportunist who is more interested in his own fortunes rather than the well-being of the Iranian people.   He is regarded as corrupt, having amassed huge personal wealth. Since his presidency, he has sought to use his ties with both conservatives and reformists in his role as the chairman of the powerful Council of Expediency for his own gains.   At the same time, the reformist Islamists under Khatami - who believe in Islam as an ideology of political and social transformation but reject violence as a means to achieve it - failed to deliver on their promises.   Khatami had promised the Iranians, who elected him twice in landslides, to create what he called "Islamic civil society" and "Islamic democracy," with a "dialogue of civilizations" underpinning Iran's foreign relations.   Although he made some progress, Khatami ultimately found himself greatly limited and frustrated by his conservative opponents, led by Khamanei.   Khatami failed to sufficiently enhance the cause of democratic rights and freedoms. Nor did he bring about an equitable distribution of Iran's oil wealth, open up the economy or improve the living conditions for a majority of Iranians.   Khatami's approach to dealing with his factional opponents was one of political passivity; he was careful not to rock the boat that had also produced him. This disillusioned many conservative voters who found him too liberal, and many young voters who felt that he was too cautious.   Iran has a fast-growing population of more than 70 million, of whom 65 percent are below the age of 25. They are keen to secure wider political participation and enjoy better standards of living.   Khatami also received little international support for his reformist efforts. The European Union continued its critical engagement with Iran, but paid only lip service to Khatami's reforms, partly because it did not want to offend the conservatives who were necessary for continued lucrative trade with Iran.   Added to this was the pattern of U.S. demonization of Iran ever since the overthrow of the U.S.-backed regime of the shah 26 years ago. The demonization intensified after the election of President George W. Bush and the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Bush's labeling of Iran as a member of the "axis of evil" and the charge that it was seeking to produce nuclear weapons did not help Khatami and his supporters.   Indeed, Bush's approach played straight into the hands of their conservative opponents, preventing the reformists from taking any action that might expose them to the charge of "sleeping with the enemy." This contributed considerably to the strengthening of the conservatives' position at the expense of the reformists in Iranian politics.   Ahmadinejad's election now presents Bush with a dilemma: to come to terms with the Islamic regime and pursue a course of understanding and reconciliation, or opt for a policy of confrontation that could prove very costly for all sides.   It is here that the European Union might play a useful bridging role to avoid conflict.   (Amin Saikal is a professor of political science and director of the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University.)   June 24, 2005 (AP)   Iranians began voting Friday to decide a two-man presidential race between a well-known political moderate and his hard-line rival who says the nation must reclaim the values of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.   The run-off election is considered too close to predict. First results are expected early Saturday.   The winner of last week's first round, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, has received a flood of support from liberal and business groups seeking to protect the liberalizing reforms since the late 1990s.   His surprise opponent, Tehran's ultraconservative mayor Mahoud Ahmadinejad, has built on his strong appeal among Iran's impoverished classes and powerful forces opposing any changes to the Islamic regime.   Iran's stance in delicate nuclear talks with the West is shaping up as a key issue dividing the two presidential candidates. It also is a top campaign issue for Iranians themselves, who view the nuclear program as a source of both national pride and worrying tension with the United States and Europe.   Ahmadinejad, 49, has indicated he will push for a tougher position at the talks if he becomes president. But key nuclear officials have said they'd like to see the country's top job go to Rafsanjani, 70.   The United States accuses Iran of using a peaceful nuclear program as a cover to develop an atomic bomb. Iran maintains its program is peaceful and aimed only at generating electricity.   Ahmadinejad, in comments that drew sharp criticism from the Foreign Ministry, accused Iran's nuclear negotiators Monday of being weak and bowing to European pressure at the negotiation table. He also told a news conference last week he could not foresee improved ties with any country that "seeks hostility" against Iran, a reference to the United States.   The two face the head-to-head runoff after both failed to win a majority in the first round of the election, which ended with bitter accusations that Republican Guards and other hard-liners helped fix the vote in Ahmadinejad's favor.   Iran's 70 million population is tipped toward the young. More than half are under 25 years old and many tend to support self-declared moderate Rafsanjani.   Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, finds support among backers of the Islamic system and the millions of impoverished Iranians who believe he will give them a fairer share of the regime's money and attention.   Rafsanjani, who served as president from 1989 to 1997, has been lauded by Iran's top nuclear officials. They say the country needs his wisdom and experience to handle the nuclear negotiations.   Gholamreza Aghazadeh, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said during a recent interview that Rafsanjani was the only person who could positively present Iran's position, given his influence, moderate views and political clout.   Hasan Rowhani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, said Iran needed a powerful and experienced president to successfully handle the issue - an open reference to Rafsanjani.   Iran suspended all uranium enrichment-related activities last November to avoid possible United Nations sanctions.   In negotiations with Europeans last month, Iran agreed to continue its suspension in exchange for a European pledge to come up with comprehensive proposals for a new round of talks later this year.   However, Iran has always said its suspension is temporary and it will never abandon enrichment. Uranium enriched to low levels has energy uses, while highly enriched uranium can be used in bombs. France, Britain and Germany have offered economic incentives in the hope of persuading Iran to permanently halt enrichment.   Copyright 2005 The Associated Press. Visit the related web page
	Bolivia, The Poor Little Rich Country by William Powers International Herald Tribune, The Nation Bolivia   June 2005   For three weeks, Bolivia has been paralyzed by blockades and protests, an uprising that forced the president, Carlos Mesa, to resign last week. The protesters, primarily indigenous Indians, want to nationalize Bolivia''s vast natural gas reserves, South America''s second largest; BP has quintupled its estimate of Bolivia''s proven reserves to 29 trillion cubic feet, worth a whopping $250 billion. The Indians are in a showdown with the International Monetary Fund and companies like British Gas, Repsol of Spain and Brazil''s Petrobras that have already invested billions of dollars in exploration and extraction.Many are calling developments of the past several years in Bolivia a war against globalization, but in fact this is more of a struggle over who has power here. An American Indian majority is standing up to the light-skinned, European elite and its corruption-fueled relations with the world.   When the Spanish Empire closed shop here in 1825, the Europeans who stayed on didn''t seem to notice - and still don''t. Even within Latin America, Bolivia is known for its corruption. It''s also divided along a razor-sharp racial edge. Highland and Amazon peoples compose almost two-thirds of the population. And while Indians are no longer forcibly sprayed with DDT for bugs and are today allowed into town squares, Bolivian apartheid - a "pigmentocracy of power" - continues.   I''ve been here for three years as an aid official, and exclusion is part of life. Indians are barred from swimming pools at some clubs, for example; they are still "peones" on eastern haciendas little touched by land reform. Meanwhile, Bolivia''s energy-rich eastern states are agitating for "autonomy" in a thinly disguised effort to deprive the poor Indian west of oil and gas revenues.   What is to be done to prevent a collapse in Bolivia? The answer, of course, must begin with Bolivians themselves. Elites here must recognize that the country''s dark-skinned social movements are stronger than any political party or president and will not go away. Any lasting solution must shift real power to Bolivia''s poor majority.   We''ll see a lot of political maneuvering in the coming days. Some of the roadblocks were dismantled in the wake of Mesa''s ouster and the installation of a new interim president, Eduardo Rodríguez, the former head of the Supreme Court. But sustained stability depends on movement toward more equality, not just cosmetic changes, starting with speedy national elections and a constituent assembly with the full power to rewrite the Constitution and decide who benefits from Bolivia''s petroleum.   Solving the crisis, however, depends not just on ending exclusion, but also on how the rest of the world relates to Bolivia, South America''s poorest country, particularly through economic policy. In Bolivia, we must also accept that democracy means, well, letting people decide what to do with their own resources. Existing contracts with foreign oil companies were signed by corrupt Bolivian leaders, without the approval of Congress. Even if nationalizing petroleum may be a growth-zapping bad idea, we need to let Bolivians themselves decide.   Moreover, our own ideas for this region are not always so fabulous. Bolivia was the testing ground for the IMF''s "shock therapy" liberalization in 1985. This stringent recipe has made millions for oilmen and industrial soy farmers here (neither sector creates much employment) but has not reduced inequality; 20 years later, Bolivia''s income levels are stagnant or worse, and half the population lives on less than $2 a day.   Besides taking a respectful hands off, the world should contribute one vital thing toward a more democratic society that embraces Indians: debt relief to the reforming government. Bolivia''s debt load has risen to 82 percent of gross domestic product, sucking up a mind-boggling 40 percent of fiscal expenditures. This is a recipe for more poverty and turmoil.   Meanwhile, the Indians, distrusting Rodríguez''s promise to call elections and talk to proponents of nationalization, are keeping some of the roadblocks in place and may reopen others, a tactic that costs millions of dollars in lost commerce, hurting the Indians themselves most of all. But as one Quechua Indian told me as he crossed his arms in front of my taxi here in Samaipata, vaguely evoking Tiananmen Square: "Our cultures have been blocked for 500 years. This is our only voice."   * William Powers is the author of the book on Bolivia, A Natural Nation.   June 2005   Bolivia''s Battle of Wills, by Christian Parenti. (The Nation)   At a roadblock on the Bolivian altiplano, a group of indigenous tin miners in brown fiberglass helmets, their jaws bulging with coca leaves, lounge around on an empty strip of road. Suddenly the thin, high-altitude air shakes with a quick explosion. Everyone laughs. The comrades are killing time by tossing lit dynamite into a field. Tomorrow they will march across these high empty plains, through the sprawling, impoverished, majority Indian city of El Alto and over the edge of a steep canyon down into the capital of La Paz, and there lay siege to the government.   The miners have held this road for the past twenty-four hours. Both main arteries linking La Paz to the outside world are shut down. The Bolivian economy is beginning to sputter and stall; before long the restaurants, hotels and offices of the capital will start to run out of food and fuel; uncollected garbage will pile up in the streets. Soon six major cities will be sealed off by more than eighty blockades.   "The Congress is dominated by the transnational corporations. We are fighting to recover our natural resources. It is our right," says a stern miner named Miguel Sureta.   The social movements--a host of mostly indigenous organizations representing Aymara and Quechua peasants, miners, teachers, urban community organizations, coca growers and the oldest national labor federation--are demanding nationalization of the country''s massive natural gas reserves, now estimated to be the second-largest in the hemisphere, at 53 trillion cubic feet. Their other plank is a constituent assembly to reformulate Bolivia''s political system and give greater power to the majority indigenous population.   Throughout South America, center-left governments are taking power, with Uruguay and Ecuador being the latest to join the trend. Bolivia, home to some of the most well-organized and radical popular movements on the continent, could be next. But the challenges facing the Bolivian left are enormous: Despite all its strength, it is riven by ideological disputes, pervasive Quechua versus Aymara ethnic factionalism and the constant clash of leadership egos.   Meanwhile, the right is also mobilizing. European-descended elites in the gas-rich lowland provinces of Santa Cruz and Tarija are agitating for autonomy or possible secession. The major oil companies operating in Bolivia are all threatening disinvestment if the industry is restructured. There are also rumors of a possible military coup.   On June 6 the centrist president, Carlos Mesa Gisbert, resigned. For a tense week it seemed the next president would be Hormando Vaca Díez, president of the Senate, a right-wing cattle rancher who warned that continued protest would "end in authoritarian government." But now Eduardo Rodriguez, head of the Supreme Court, has been sworn in as Bolivia''s president. He is obliged to hold elections within six months..   * Visit the link below to access the complete article. Visit the related web page
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