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	The Failed States Index by Foreign Policy & The Fund for Peace Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.   August 2005   About 2 billion people live in countries that are in danger of collapse.   In the first annual Failed States Index, FOREIGN POLICY and the Fund for Peace rank the countries about to go over the brink.   America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” That was the conclusion of the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy. For a country whose foreign policy in the 20th century was dominated by the struggles against powerful states such as Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, the U.S. assessment is striking. Nor is the United States alone in diagnosing the problem. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has warned that “ignoring failed states creates problems that sometimes come back to bite us.” French President Jacques Chirac has spoken of “the threat that failed states carry for the world’s equilibrium.” World leaders once worried about who was amassing power; now they worry about the absence of it.   Failed states have made a remarkable odyssey from the periphery to the very center of global politics. During the Cold War, state failure was seen through the prism of superpower conflict and was rarely addressed as a danger in its own right. In the 1990s, “failed states” fell largely into the province of humanitarians and human rights activists, although they did begin to consume the attention of the world’s sole superpower, which led interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. For so-called foreign-policy realists, however, these states and the problems they posed were a distraction from weightier issues of geopolitics.   Now, it seems, everybody cares. The dangerous exports of failed states—whether international terrorists, drug barons, or weapons arsenals—are the subject of endless discussion and concern. For all the newfound attention, however, there is still uncertainty about the definition and scope of the problem. How do you know a failed state when you see one? Of course, a government that has lost control of its territory or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force has earned the label. But there can be more subtle attributes of failure. Some regimes, for example, lack the authority to make collective decisions or the capacity to deliver public services. In other countries, the populace may rely entirely on the black market, fail to pay taxes, or engage in large-scale civil disobedience. Outside intervention can be both a symptom of and a trigger for state collapse. A failed state may be subject to involuntary restrictions of its sovereignty, such as political or economic sanctions, the presence of foreign military forces on its soil, or other military constraints, such as a no-fly zone.   How many states are at serious risk of state failure? The World Bank has identified about 30 “low-income countries under stress,” whereas Britain’s Department for International Development has named 46 “fragile” states of concern. A report commissioned by the CIA has put the number of failing states at about 20.   To present a more precise picture of the scope and implications of the problem, the Fund for Peace, an independent research organization, and FOREIGN POLICY have conducted a global ranking of weak and failing states. Using 12 social, economic, political, and military indicators, we ranked 60 states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict. (For each indicator, the Fund for Peace computed scores using software that analyzed data from tens of thousands of international and local media sources from the last half of 2004. For a complete discussion of the 12 indicators, please go to www.ForeignPolicy.com or www.fundforpeace.org.) The resulting index provides a profile of the new world disorder of the 21st century and demonstrates that the problem of weak and failing states is far more serious than generally thought. About 2 billion people live in insecure states, with varying degrees of vulnerability to widespread civil conflict.   The instability that the index diagnoses has many faces. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Somalia, state failure has been apparent for years, manifested by armed conflict, famine, disease outbreaks, and refugee flows. In other cases, however, instability is more elusive. Often, corrosive elements have not yet triggered open hostilities, and pressures may be bubbling just below the surface. Large stretches of lawless territory exist in many countries in the index, but that territory has not always been in open revolt against state institutions.   Conflict may be concentrated in local territories seeking autonomy or secession (as in the Philippines and Russia). In other countries, instability takes the form of episodic fighting, drug mafias, or warlords dominating large swaths of territory (as in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Somalia). State collapse sometimes happens suddenly, but often the demise of the state is a slow and steady deterioration of social and political institutions (Zimbabwe and Guinea are good examples). Some countries emerging from conflict may be on the mend but in danger of backsliding (Sierra Leone and Angola). The World Bank found that, within five years, half of all countries emerging from civil unrest fall back into conflict in a cycle of collapse (Haiti and Liberia).   The 10 most at-risk countries in the index have already shown clear signs of state failure. Ivory Coast, a country cut in half by civil war, is the most vulnerable to disintegration; it would probably collapse completely if U.N. peacekeeping forces pulled out. It is followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Yemen, Liberia, and Haiti. The index includes others whose instability is less widely acknowledged, including Bangladesh (17th), Guatemala (31st), Egypt (38th), Saudi Arabia (45th), and Russia (59th).   Weak states are most prevalent in Africa, but they also appear in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Experts have for years discussed an “arc of instability”—an expression that came into use in the 1970s to refer to a “Muslim Crescent” extending from Afghanistan to the “Stans” in the southern part of the former Soviet Union. Our study suggests that the concept is too narrow. The geography of weak states reveals a territorial expanse that extends from Moscow to Mexico City, far wider than an “arc” would suggest, and not limited to the Muslim world.   The index does not provide any easy answers for those looking to shore up countries on the brink. Elections are almost universally regarded as helpful in reducing conflict. However, if they are rigged, conducted during active fighting, or attract a low turnout, they can be ineffective or even harmful to stability. Electoral democracy appears to have had only a modest impact on the stability of states such as Iraq, Rwanda, Kenya, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Indonesia. Ukraine ranks as highly vulnerable in large part because of last year’s disputed election.   What are the clearest early warning signs of a failing state? Among the 12 indicators we use, two consistently rank near the top. Uneven development is high in almost all the states in the index, suggesting that inequality within states—and not merely poverty—increases instability. Criminalization or delegitimization of the state, which occurs when state institutions are regarded as corrupt, illegal, or ineffective, also figured prominently. Facing this condition, people often shift their allegiances to other leaders—opposition parties, warlords, ethnic nationalists, clergy, or rebel forces. Demographic factors, especially population pressures stemming from refugees, internally displaced populations, and environmental degradation, are also found in most at-risk countries, as are consistent human rights violations. Identifying the signs of state failure is easier than crafting solutions, but pinpointing where state collapse is likely is a necessary first step.   Copyright 2005, The Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Visit the related web page
	Of Riots and Minority Rights in India by J. Sri Raman Truthout - Perspective India   16 August 2005   The past few days have brought back memories of the assassinations of two Prime Ministers of India. Even more searing, however, has been the accompanying and acutely painful reminder of unsettled issues of minority rights in this multi-religious, multi-ethnic country.   On August 8 came a belated reminder of questions that should have been settled within a reasonable time after the assassination of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984. The report of the latest in a long series of commissions of inquiry into the post-assassination anti-Sikh riots was tabled in India's parliament over two decades after the bloody event.   Indira had fallen to the bullet of Sikh guards at her residence. The ensuing attacks on the minority Sikh community, especially in New Delhi but also across the country, left thousands dead and many more thousands homeless and helpless. The carnage lasted three days, conspicuously without any official hindrance.   The wounds left by the violence may have begun to heal over the recent period. The Justice G.T. Nanavati commission's report, released to the public six months after its submission to the government, has now reopened the wounds.   May 21, 1991, saw the gruesome assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Indira's son. A female suicide bomber succeeded in blowing him to bits. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who had once enjoyed official hospitality and sanctuary in India, were blamed for the crime, though they have continued to deny their involvement to this day.   Memories of the LTTE and Indian politics centered on it, especially in Tamil Nadu, the state closest to Sri Lanka, returned with the assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar, Sri Lanka's foreign minister of Tamil origin on August 12 night. The LTTE have again been blamed for the crime, reminiscent of the Fredrick Forsyth's "Day of the Jackal," though they have again denied their involvement.   This assassination, however, has caused fewer ripples in Tamil Nadu than some may have expected. The Tigers, it is true, enjoy some sympathy in political sections subscribing to the idea of a pan-Tamil identity. The virtual silence from such political parties on the post-assassination issue, however, has been eloquent. Some of these parties, part of the ruling federal coalition, have preferred to speak in almost the same voice as New Delhi. Some other parties, more stridently pro-LTTE at other times, have opted for silence as supporters of the federal coalition.   They can afford to do so because the entire affair does not really involve any issue of an Indian minority's rights. This is not the case with the revived issue of anti-Sikh riots that has rocked Parliament and spilled over to the streets.   I remember being driven 21 years ago in a newspaper's car with my wife and our months-old daughter from a riot-hit part of New Delhi to a safer haven. Howling mobs armed with broken bottles and other weapons lined our way on both sides, and we had to stop several times to let the avengers look for turbaned and bearded Sikhs inside the vehicle before letting us proceed.   Striking to us, above all, was the utter absence of any police or paramilitary personnel all along the route. This was also the most visible (or invisible?) feature of the sanguinary 72 hours, to most other observers as well. Yet the Nanavati report found no evidence of political higher-ups' involvement in the orchestrated orgy. Little wonder that the report elicited as angry a reaction as the riots themselves did.   Initially, the government made it worse with its "action taken report" (ATR). It actually turned out to be a report of action not taken, even on the very few and feeble recommendations of further investigations into charges against a handful of local luminaries of the Congress Party heading the federal coalition.   Subsequently, the government made amends of sorts, with an apology to the aggrieved community as well as to the entire nation from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the promise of further investigations. It is not these steps, however, that restrained the main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from a relentlessly furious pursuit of the issue.   The profound irony of the far-right BJP's feigned indignation over the issue, in fact, was not lost upon either the political observers or the public. There were severe limits to which the party could press on, in the light of its record in power in Delhi. It only needed a gentle reminder about Gujarat to nudge the party into a more guarded and less militant mood.   The police might have been invisible on the riot-torn Delhi streets, but it was present in strength to help the anti-Muslim rioters along in all the affected parts of Gujarat. The police participation in the three-month-long carnage, which took a toll of about 3,000 lives, made it a pogrom. It made senior police officer Harsh Mander put in his papers and launch a protest movement against the politics of massacre.   Gujarat chief minister Narendra Modi, who presided over the pogrom, stays put in his office to this day. The national leadership of the BJP has never deemed it necessary to demand his resignation.   True, the Prime Minister's apology - or the Congress Party's sometime ago - offers no substitute for long-overdue action to find the culprits behind the anti-Sikh riots and punish them. What deserves note, however, is that the BJP has never apologized for Gujarat. Modi and national leaders of the party have, in fact, repeatedly asserted their pride over the riots. The party made its elation over the carnage its electoral plank in Gujarat and, at one point, even threatened to "repeat Gujarat" elsewhere.   The political-ideological differences between the Congress and the BJP, however, spell poor comfort not only to the endangered minorities but even more to all defenders of minority rights as an essential ingredient of democracy.   (A freelance journalist and a peace activist of India, J. Sri Raman is the author of Flashpoint (Common Courage Press, USA). He is a regular contributor to Truthout).
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