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	Ex-CIA official: Bush administration misused Iraq intelligence by CNN International / Reuters USA   February 10, 2006   The Bush administration disregarded the expertise of the intelligence community, politicized the intelligence process and used unrepresentative data in making the case for war, a former CIA senior analyst alleged.   In an article published on Friday in the journal Foreign Affairs, Paul R. Pillar, the CIA"s national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005, called the relationship between U.S. intelligence and policymaking "broken."   "In the wake of the Iraq war, it has become clear that official intelligence analysis was not relied on in making even the most significant national security decisions, that intelligence was misused publicly to justify decisions already made," Pillar wrote.   Although the Clinton administration and other countries" governments also believed that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was amassing weapons of mass destruction, they supported sanctions and weapons inspections as means to contain the threat, he said.   The Bush administration"s decision to go to war indicates other motivations, Pillar wrote, namely a power shake-up in the Middle East and a hastened "spread of more liberal politics and economics in the region."   The Bush administration "used intelligence not to inform decision-making, but to justify a decision already made," Pillar wrote. "It went to war without requesting -- and evidently without being influenced by -- any strategic-level intelligence assessments on any aspect of Iraq."   Though Pillar himself was responsible for coordinating intelligence assessments on Iraq, "the first request I received from any administration policymaker for any such assessment was not until a year into the war," he wrote.   Pillar: Intelligence was right   Pillar said much of the intelligence on Iraq proved to have been correct.   Prior to the March 2003 invasion, the intelligence community concluded that the road to democracy in Iraq would be "long, difficult and turbulent" and forecast power struggles between Shiites and Sunnis, Pillar said.   Intelligence experts also predicted that an occupying force would be attacked "unless it established security and put Iraq on the road to prosperity" immediately after the fall of Hussein, he wrote.   As to whether Iraq pursued nuclear weapons, intelligence reports had concluded Iraq was years away from developing them and was unlikely to use such weapons against the United States unless cornered, Pillar said.   The biggest discrepancy between public statements by the Bush administration and judgments by the intelligence community centered on the relationship between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, he said.   "The enormous attention devoted to this subject did not reflect any judgment by intelligence officials that there was or was likely to be anything like the "alliance" the administration said existed."   Rather, "the administration wanted to hitch the Iraq expedition to the "war on terror" and the threat the American public feared most, thereby capitalizing on the country"s militant post-9/11 mood," Pillar wrote.   White House at odds with intelligence   Pillar cited an August 2002 speech by Vice President Dick Cheney that said "intelligence is an uncertain business" and that intelligence analysts had underestimated how close Iraq was to developing a nuclear weapon before the 1991 Persian Gulf War.   "His conclusion -- at odds with that of the intelligence community -- was that "many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon." After such remarks, the intelligence community was left "to register varying degrees of private protest," he said.   Pillar also cited President Bush"s claim, made in his 2003 State of the Union address, that Iraq was purchasing uranium ore from an African country.   "U.S. intelligence analysts had questioned the credibility of the report making this claim, had kept it out of their own unclassified products, and had advised the White House not to use it publicly," Pillar said.   "But the administration put the claim into the speech anyway, referring to it as information from British sources in order to make the point without explicitly vouching for the intelligence."   Reorganization criticized   Pillar described a "poisonous atmosphere" in which intelligence officers, including himself, were accused by administration officials of trying to sabotage the president"s policies.   "This poisonous atmosphere reinforced the disinclination within the intelligence community to challenge the consensus view about Iraqi WMD programs; any such challenge would have served merely to reaffirm the presumptions of the accusers."   Pillar also criticized the December 2004 reorganization of the intelligence community that made intelligence leaders serve at the pleasure of the president, saying they need more independence.   Congress and the American people must get serious about "fixing intelligence," he said. "At stake are the soundness of U.S. foreign policymaking and the right of Americans to know the basis for decisions taken in the name of their security."   Pillar, now on the faculty of Georgetown University"s Security Studies Program, called for experienced intelligence officers to lead nonpartisan oversight of U.S. intelligence efforts as well as inquiries at the request of members of Congress.   He also called for public discussion on how to improve the relationship between intelligence officials and policymakers, but said there is no clear fix.   "The current ill will may not be reparable, and the perception of the intelligence community on the part of some policymakers -- that Langley is enemy territory -- is unlikely to change," Pillar wrote, referring to CIA headquarters.   Feb 2006   US Vice-President authorised Aide to leak in CIA Case: Report. (Reuters)   US Vice-President Dick Cheney directed his aide Lewis "Scooter" Libby to use classified material to discredit a critic of the Bush administration"s Iraq war effort, the National Journal has reported.   Court papers released last week show that Libby was authorised to disclose classified information to news reporters by "his superiors", in an effort to counteract diplomat Joe Wilson"s charge that the Bush administration twisted intelligence on Iraq"s nuclear weapons to justify the 2003 invasion.   The US weekly magazine, citing attorneys familiar with the matter, reported that Mr Cheney was among those superiors referred to in a letter from prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald to Libby"s lawyers.   A lawyer for Mr Cheney had no immediate comment.   Libby, Mr Cheney"s former chief of staff, faces perjury and other charges in the leak of the identity of Wilson"s wife Valerie Plame, a move that effectively ended her career at the CIA.   Libby has pleaded not guilty to five counts of perjury, making false statements and obstruction of justice.   Mr Cheney"s name has surfaced in other court documents as well. According to an appeals-court decision made public last Friday, "the Vice-President informed Libby "in an off sort of curiosity sort of fashion" that Mr Wilson"s wife worked at the CIA one month before her identity was made public.   Both documents cite testimony Libby made to a grand jury.   Lawyers for Libby could not be reached for comment.   Senator Edward Kennedy, a Massachusetts Democrat, said Mr Cheney"s efforts to discredit Wilson could have risked national security.   "The Vice-President"s vindictiveness in defending the misguided war in Iraq is obvious. If he used classified information to defend it, he should be prepared to take full responsibility," he said.   White House spokesman Scott McClellan declined to comment. "Our policy is we"re not going to discuss this while there"s an ongoing legal proceeding," he said.   17 December 2005   Colin Powell describes his disappointment with failings of US Intelligence on Iraq. (BBC News)   In an interview with Sir David Frost for the BBC World TV channel, Ex-US Secretary of State Colin Powell described his disappointment with the failings of US intelligence on Iraq, and his arguments with Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld over the campaign.   He accepted that Washington"s moral authority was under pressure at the moment. "The United States is going through a period right now where public opinion world-wide is against us. "I think that"s a function of some of the policies we have followed in recent years with respect to Iraq and in not solving the Middle East"s problem and perhaps the way in which we have communicated our views to the rest of the world, we have created an impression that we are unilateralist, we don"t care what the rest of the world thinks. "I don"t think it"s a fair impression"   Questioned on the evidence held up by the US as proof that Iraq had a weapons of mass destruction programme, he said: "I was deeply disappointed in what the intelligence community had presented to me and to the rest of us, and what really upset me more than anything else was that there were people in the intelligence community that had doubts about some of this sourcing, but those doubts never surfaced up to us."   He also referred to his relationship with Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice-President Dick Cheney - often depicted as icy. "Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney and I occasionally would have strong differing views on matters. And when that was the case we argued them out, we fought them out, in bureaucratic ways," he said.   "Often maybe Mr Rumsfeld and Vice-President Cheney would take decisions into the president that the rest of us weren"t aware of. That did happen, on a number of occasions."   Asked about post-war planning for Iraq, Mr Powell said his state department staff drew up detailed plans, but they were discarded by Mr Rumsfeld"s defence department, which was backed by the White House. "Mr Rumsfeld and I had some serious discussions, of a not pleasant kind, about the use of individuals who could bring expertise to the issue. And it ultimately went into the White House, and the rest is well known."
	UN Secretary-General welcomes Moscow talks on Iran’s uranium enrichment by UN News / AP / Tribune Media Services Iran   17 February 2006   UN Secretary-General welcomes Moscow talks on Iran’s uranium enrichment. (UN News)   Secretary-General Kofi Annan today welcomed reports confirming that Iran will hold talks in Moscow on 20 February on a Russian proposal on uranium enrichment, according to a statement released by his spokesman today.   “As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia’s contribution to bringing all sides back to the negotiating table is vital,” said the spokesman, Stephane Dujarric.   Mr. Dujarric said that the Secretary-General trusts that Iran will use the talks in Moscow and the period between now and early March to take the necessary steps to rebuild confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.   “He hopes that Iran will respond positively to the resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he said.   “It is time for all those Governments who support and rely on this regime for their own and our collective security to help resolve this crisis in a way that maintains the regime’s integrity and effectiveness,” concluded Mr. Dujarric’s statement.   January 20, 2006   Iran ready to talk about proposal, Russia says. (Associated Press)   Moscow — The head of Russia"s atomic energy agency said Friday that Iran is ready for detailed discussions on the proposal to conduct Iran"s uranium enrichment in Russia.   The proposal, under which uranium would be enriched in Russia for use in Iranian reactors, is aimed at eliminating concerns that Iran could enrich its own uranium to higher levels for use in nuclear weapons.   The United States and the European Union have backed the Russian proposal as a way out of the deadlock over Iran"s nuclear program. International pressure on Iran has mounted sharply over the past two weeks since Iran removed United Nations seals on its uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz.   Western countries are pushing for Iran to be referred to the UN Security Council, a move that could bring sanctions. Russia and China have held back from supporting the referral, although the Kremlin has said it is concerned over Iran"s defiance of the international community.   Iran “considers our proposal extremely interesting and is prepared for detailed discussions,” Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of the Russian atomic energy agency, told President Vladimir Putin in televised remarks. “Our Iranian partners should come here in the near future and talks will take place constantly,” Mr. Kiriyenko said.   Tehran, 19 Jan. 2006   Link the Nuclear Program to Human Rights, by Shirin Ebadi and Muhammad Sahimi. (Tribune Media Services)   Lost in the international fury over Iran"s partial restart of its nuclear energy program and the deplorable statements by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad regarding Israel is the fact that respect for human rights and democracy are the most effective deterrent against the threat that any aspiring nuclear power, including Iran, may pose to the world.   When the United States and its allies encouraged the shah to start Iran"s nuclear energy program in the 1970s, at a time when it had no economic justification, they helped create the Frankenstein that ultimately became Iran"s current nuclear program.   If, instead, they had pressed the shah to undertake political reforms, respect human rights and release Iran"s political prisoners, history could have been very different.   Since the 1970s, India, South Africa, North Korea, Israel and Pakistan have joined the nuclear club. South Africa subsequently dismantled its bombs under the democratic government of Nelson Mandela. Nobody perceives India, the world"s largest democracy, as a threat to the world. Israel is not likely to be the first nation in the Middle East to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.   But North Korea"s nuclear program is a threat because its regime is secretive and its leader a recluse. The nuclear arsenal of Pakistan is dangerous because Pakistan"s military, which runs the country and is populated by Islamic extremists, helped create the Taliban and allowed Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan"s nuclear supermarket, to operate freely but secretly for so long.   Iran"s nuclear program began accelerating around 1997, when Mohammad Khatami was elected president. But the world started paying much closer attention to it in 2003.   That was because the first few years of Khatami"s presidency witnessed the development of an independent and vocal press and the election in 2000 of a reformist Parliament.   The reformists, while supporting the nuclear program, demanded that it be fully transparent and in compliance with Iran"s international obligations. These were all reassurances that Iran"s nuclear program would not get out of control.   But instead of backing Iran"s fledgling democratic movement, which would have led to nuclear transparency, the United States undercut it by demonizing Iran.   Whereas Khatami proposed people-to-people dialogue with the United States, Washington every year blocks a large number of Iranian scholars, artists and authors from visiting America.   In return for Khatami"s assistance in the war in Afghanistan, President George W. Bush designated Iran a member of the "axis of evil."   In response to the overwhelming victory of reformists in the 2000 elections to the Iranian Parliament, the United States lifted sanctions on importing Iranian pistachios and carpets - which hardly made a dent in Iran"s troubled economy.   Then by 2003, when it became clear that Khatami"s reforms had stalled and Iran"s independent press had been crushed by the hard-liners, the world started paying closer attention to Iran"s nuclear program.   So what has demonizing Iran achieved?   Addressing Iran"s nuclear program should entail neither threatening Iran with military strikes nor dragging it before the United Nations Security Council.   While a vast majority of Iranians despise the ruling hard-liners and wish for their downfall, they also support Iran"s nuclear program because, aside from being economically justified, it has become a source of national pride in an ancient nation with a glorious history.   Moreover, the driving force behind the nuclear program are hard-liners who currently control the Parliament and the presidency through rigged elections. They fiercely oppose Iran"s democratic movement and will use any threat of military attack as an excuse to crush the democratic movement.   In fact, a military attack would only inflame nationalist sentiments. Iranians remember the U.S. help to Iraq during its war with Iran. They see the double standards when the United States offers security guarantees and aid to North Korea and advanced nuclear technology to India, but nothing but sanctions and threats to Iran.   Iran is not Iraq: Given the Iranians" fierce nationalism and the Shiites" trandition of martyrdom, any military move on Iran would receive a response that would engulf the entire region in fire.   Taking Iran to the UN Security Council and imposing sanctions on it would prompt the hard-liners to leave the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its Additional Protocol. Is the world ready to live with such terrifying prospects?   But the West does have leverage to move Iran toward democracy without interferring in its internal affairs.   The hard-liners need continued commerce with the European Union and would like the same with the United States. But in all their dialogue with Iran, the Europeans have been paying only lip service to the cause of democracy and human rights in Iran.   So, what can the West do?   First, Western nations with clean human rights records should urge the United Nations to appoint a special human rights monitor for Iran, to raise Iran"s human rights record annually at General Assembly, and to condemn it if the record keeps deteriorating.   Contrary to the general perception, Iran"s clerics are sensitive to outside criticism. There has been tangible improvement in Iran"s human rights record whenever it has been criticized at the United Nations.   Second, the World Bank should stop providing Iran with loans. Instead, it should try to work with nongovernmental organizations and the private sector in Iran to strengthen institutions of civil society.   The West should support Iran"s human rights and democracy advocates, nominate their jailed leaders for international awards and keep them and their cause in the public eyes.   Third, if the hardliners continue violating the basic human rights, the West should downgrade its diplomatic relationships with Iran.   Fourth, the EU must declare unequivocally, backed by practical steps, that new investments - which Iran badly needs - will be provided only if Iran takes practical steps towards establishing a democratic political system.   As a signatory of the nonproliferation treaty, Iran is entitled to the peaceful use of nuclear technology - including uranium enrichment, the main source of concern in its nuclear program. So demanding that Iran set aside its enrichment program forever is a non-starter.   No Iranian government, regardless of its ideology or democratic credentials, would dare stop Iran"s nuclear energy program.   The Russian proposal, to enrich uranium for Iran in Russia, is also not acceptable, since it implies that Iran should give up its rights under the nonproliferation treaty.   The fact is that Iran does not need enriched uranium for at least a decade. The latest U.S. National Intelligence Estimate indicates that Iran is at least six to 10 years away from making a nuclear bomb. So there is ample time for political reforms in Iran before it ever develops the bomb.   So the West should insist that Iran can start a limited uranium enrichment program, strictly safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the framework of Iran"s proposal to the EU in March 2005, but only if it undertakes meaningful and lasting reforms - including the freeing of political prisoners, allowing true freedom of speech, the development of an independent press and the participation of all political groups in the political process.   Finally, the United States and Iran should enter direct negotiations. It is absurd for the United States and the most important nation in the Middle East not to have direct talks.   The Bush administration should not allow itself to be seduced by exile groups that have no support in Iran. Development of democracy is an internal affair of Iranians in Iran. The West should support them, but not try to decide for them who should run their country.   Ahmadinejad recently said, "If we abandon our enrichment program, the West will bring up our human rights record." This was a recognition that the hard-liners consider their Achilles" heel to be violation of human rights, and not violation of Iran"s international nuclear obligations.   Given a young and educated population in Iran that yearns for democracy, the steps described above would be far more effective than any other means for alleviating and even eliminating concerns about Iran"s nuclear program.   Democracy would provide the ultimate safeguards, since a truly democratic government in Iran, backed by a great majority of Iranians, could well feel secure enough not to pursue dangerous nuclear adventures.   (Shirin Ebadi, a lawyer human rights advocate, was awarded the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize. Muhammad Sahimi is professor of chemical engineering at the University of Southern California)
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