North Korea Drifts towards Abyss by Roy Eccleston, Washington Correspondent The Australian 3:21pm 24th May, 2003   May 24, 2003    IT was a question the US's No 2 diplomat didn't want to answer: would Washington allow North Korea to reprocess about 8000 used nuclear fuel rods into plutonium for bombs?    "How would you propose to stop it?" hit back Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage at a small press conference with Australian reporters earlier this year.    Well, replied this reporter, lacking a coherent North Korean policy himself: how would you propose to stop it?    Armitage demurred. With 40 per cent of the South Korean population under the range of North Korean guns, as well as more than 100,000 US troops, it didn't pay to talk tough unless he could be sure he could back it up.    "And I'm not sure I can back it up, so hence I don't answer your question."    It was hardly an edifying exchange, but it was revealing. The US had no clear public policy then on one of the most flammable issues in the world – and it still doesn't.    Distracted by Iraq, and al-Qa'ida as well, there is a strong argument the US is letting the North Korea problem drift dangerously towards a full-blown crisis that will either see Pyongyang become a nuclear power, or end in war.    "They are sensing our disarray and they see a window of opportunity," warned former US defence secretary Bill Perry this week. "They may very well pass through that window before the year is out."    Perry was former president Bill Clinton's man at the Pentagon in 1994 – the last time there was almost a war between the US and North Korea.    "What do I mean? A window by which they become a declared nuclear power, they conduct full-scale nuclear tests, they have the economic imperative to sell weapons or plutonium, and would still have enough left over to threaten Japan and South Korea."    And Perry had an answer for the question Armitage avoided – the US should have stated from the outset of the crisis that the reprocessing of plutonium would be "a red line" that if crossed, would trigger devastating US military action.    That was the Clinton policy in 1994 that almost led to war, but ultimately, believes Perry, prevented one by forcing Pyongyang to back down. A credible threat of force, backed by South Korea and Japan, would be the best guarantee of a peaceful solution.    But the US has avoided making such a threat, and North Korea claims to have begun reprocessing already. As well, there are basic differences between the US and key ally South Korea, which is more sanguine about the North's nuclear ambitions.    Perry, who spoke at a conference organised by the Council on Strategic and International Studies in Washington this week, is just one of many who worry about the lack of clarity in the Bush administration's policy on North Korea.    Over at another think tank, the Council on Foreign Relations, former US ambassador to South Korea James Laney and colleagues warned this week that the situation on the Korean peninsula was becoming more dangerous each day.    Their report urged the US to appoint a full-time high-level negotiator, work more closely with its allies and try to strike an interim deal with the North Koreans to freeze their weapons program.    The issue will be a key topic at talks early today between George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who is staying at the US President's ranch in Crawford, Texas.    Japan, along with South Korea and Taiwan, may be tempted to build its own atomic arsenals if North Korea is allowed to continue its nuclear ambitions. And that, says Perry, "would be a catastrophic development for the whole region".    To recap the problem: North Korea, a communist state of about 22 million people brutally run by Kim Jong-il, admitted last October to a US envoy it was secretly enriching uranium for nuclear bombs.    That breaches the 1994 Agreed Framework pact with the US in which North Korea was required to shut down its nuclear reactor and seal its spent nuclear fuel rods as part of its agreement not to pursue nuclear weapons.    North Korea has since kicked out international inspectors, restarted the reactor and claimed to have reprocessed most of the spent fuel rods into plutonium. If true, and the US is not convinced, that would be enough for five or six nuclear bombs.    In response, Washington has refused Pyongyang's demand for direct negotiations and urged North Korea's biggest benefactor, China, to exert pressure on Kim Jong-il. To some extent this has worked, and China hosted three-way talks in April.    At the talks, North Korea did two things. It apparently threatened to demonstrate a nuclear weapon, as well as export nuclear material. But it also appears to have put its nuclear program on the table in exchange for US security and economic guarantees.    The US has so far been dismissive, but has not ruled out more multilateral talks. While it insists it won't reward bad behaviour, it has offered a "bold approach" – without any detail – if Pyongyang completely and verifiably dismantles its nuclear programs.    The reasons for Washington's policy ambivalence are numerous. First, it doesn't know what North Korea really wants – is it committed to getting nuclear weapons, or are they a lever to win a security guarantee and economic benefits?    Second, Mr Bush despises Kim Jong-il and doesn't want to deal with him.    Third, Bush advisers are split between those who believe the US should try to create a regime collapse in North Korea and those who believe in negotiations.    Fourth, US allies have their own views. South Korea does not want a US military strike, knowing thousands of its own citizens would be killed by a North Korean counter-attack. Nor does Seoul want the sudden collapse of the regime, which would create a massive humanitarian and economic crisis on its doorstep.    Laney says the US must appoint a full-time negotiator to put together a policy that wins the strong support of South Korea, Japan and China. Washington should seek an interim deal to freeze nuclear work, reintroduce international inspectors and move the fuel rods out of North Korea.    And if negotiations fail, that coalition of regional nations would be vital to exerting pressure on the regime through "sanctions, a possible embargo, and even interdiction of possible shipments of missiles or weapons of mass destruction", Laney argues.    But nobody believes a blockade could prevent Pyongyang exporting plutonium to terrorists to wreak revenge on Washington. Nor would it stop a North Korean ballistic missile that could reach Japan – and one day Australia or the US.    Robert Gallucci, the former diplomat who helped negotiate the 1994 agreement with North Korea, says the US should begin serious negotiations and be ready to offer concessions.    Gallucci says the 1994 deal may be criticised now, but it averted war and prevented Pyongyang from acquiring enough plutonium for at least 50 bombs. Even imperfect deals can be worth doing, he argues.    The key is to act quickly. "Time is not on our side," he warned at the conference. "And I have not seen a policy yet that stops this worsening with each passing day." Visit the related web page
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