The idea of Pre-emption by Alan Kuperman, Johns Hopkins University Johns Hopkins University's School Of Advanced International Studies 5:52pm 20th Mar, 2003   Excert from PBS News Hour :- America's Role in the World    Alan Kuperman, of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, on the idea of pre-emption.    Imagine: National security officials tell the president that our adversary possesses rudimentary weapons of mass destruction and is fast developing more sophisticated ones. The enemy already has used military force to occupy neighboring countries. Moreover, he has ruthlessly killed millions of his own people to wipe out domestic opposition.    Hawkish advisers say the only way to stop him from becoming an even greater threat is to attack now -- preventively. I hate to ruin the suspense, but the outcome is already known. The case does not involve Saddam Hussein or George W. Bush. Rather, the adversary was the Soviet Union of the late 1940s. The dictator was Josef Stalin, who occupied Eastern Europe, perpetrated massive purges and ethnic cleansing and was on the verge of adding nuclear weapons. The president contemplating a first strike was Harry Truman.    Fortunately, by rejecting that option, Truman averted World War III. Instead, the USA pursued containment and deterrence policies that protected us until the Soviet's flawed government imploded.    Perhaps a preventive attack could have averted the Cold War. But the costs would have been so high and the prospects so uncertain that almost no one would advocate such a policy, in retrospect.    President Bush needs to explain what is so different this time around. Last week, after the United Nations ordered a new inspection regime for Iraq, he declared, "If Iraq fails to fully comply, the United States and other nations will disarm Saddam Hussein" by force. Bush defends his new first-strike policy as a response to the threat that some terrorists aim to attack us with weapons of mass destruction.    In this regard, however, Bush's policy is neither controversial nor novel. When confronting terrorists who cannot be deterred or appeased, and who seek to inflict death and destruction, there is no alternative to pre-emption. Bill Clinton acknowledged this when he pre-emptively tried to assassinate Osama bin Laden and his inner circle in August 1998. What is new and reckless in the Bush policy is applying this doctrine not only to global terrorists but to a state that has no record of materially supporting them, on the sole ground that the state seeks weapons of mass destruction.    While preventing proliferation is laudable, a first-strike strategy is likely to backfire by:    * Causing the wars it ostensibly seeks to prevent.    * Undermining efforts to prevent state-sponsored terrorists.    * Encouraging other states to launch similar first strikes, with potentially disastrous results.    * Undermining global alliances necessary to ensure U.S. interests, including non-proliferation.    A first-strike posture runs the risk of triggering the very wars it intends to avert. In the 1960s, Harvard's Thomas Schelling warned that if both sides adopt pre-emption policies, "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack" could cause war even if neither side actually has aggressive intention. History also teaches that "rogue" leaders can be reined in without risky invasions. In the 1980s, Libya's Moammar Gadhafi earned a reputation much like that of Saddam today. An international strategy of sanctions, deterrence and interdiction eventually persuaded the Libyan leader to cut loose the terrorists and offer restitution.    Other states also might copy the dangerous American example. The Indian government long has considered attacking Pakistan's small nuclear force pre-emptively, but has been dissuaded at least in part by U.S. exhortations and fear of international condemnation. Bush's new policy would undercut both of these incentives. History's most fundamental lesson is that military force usually spawns opposition, not compliance. Bush imagines that by smashing Iraq the USA will coerce other aspirants to regional power to abandon their ambitions. Rome had similar visions, as has every momentary hegemony. Nearly all undermined their power by abusing it in that manner.    Even if an attack on Iraq proves a short-term success, it likely would compel other states to band together diplomatically against us. Indeed, it even could encourage some to acquire weapons of mass destruction as their best guarantee against a U.S. attack. Unfortunately, the only thing Bush's new pre-emption policy is likely to pre-empt is peace. Visit the related web page
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