"How we came to fight a war over weapons that did not exist" by The Australian, The Telegraph, The Guardian.. 7:35am 6th Feb, 2004   February 06, 2004    "Tony Blair falls deeper in weapons mire" by Peter Wilson" (The Australian)    The British Government's credibility on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction took another major blow yesterday when Tony Blair admitted that right up to the eve of the war he did not know his own warning that Saddam Hussein could use WMDs within 45 minutes only applied to short-range battlefield weapons.    The Prime Minister told the House of Commons that when parliament voted for war on March 18 last year, he did not know the 45-minute warning he had released six months earlier did not cover longer-range mass missiles, as was widely believed.    The Conservative Party said Mr Blair's admission showed he had not asked the right questions of the intelligence services, and that the issue would be examined by the new closed-doors inquiry he has set up into whether British intelligence overstated the threat from Iraq.    But some MPs, including several Labour backbenchers, said Mr Blair's denial on the 45-minute claim was a lie.    The row came as five protesters dressed as judges threw whitewash and white paint on the gates outside Mr Blair's Downing Street office and residence, and the Prime Minister was interrupted by a 10-minute suspension of parliament when protesters yelled "whitewash" and other abuse from the public gallery.    The 45-minute claim was one of the main arguments in a dossier on Iraq's WMDs that Mr Blair released in September 2002, leading to headlines warning that Saddam could hit British soldiers and tourists as far away from Iraq as Cyprus within that time.    The fact the warning was limited to small-range weapons such as mortars was only revealed months after the war, at the Hutton inquiry, when Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon admitted he knew the press reports were wrong but said he felt it was not his responsibility to point out the error.    Opposition Leader Michael Howard pressured Mr Hoon in the Commons yesterday, asking: "Are you seriously suggesting you had this information but didn't pass it on to the Prime Minister?"    Mr Hoon replied that he had only known because "I asked the question out of curiosity" and said he had not told Mr Blair because "there was no debate" at the time about "the nature of the delivery process" for such weapons.    But Robin Cook, the former foreign secretary who resigned from the cabinet in protest at the war, said yesterday he was surprised by Mr Blair's denial, because he was sure the Prime Minister had known the true nature of the 45-minute warning. "In my resignation speech (before the war) I did make the very point that we were considering battlefield weapons and that Saddam probably had no real weapons of mass destruction," he said.    Mr Cook said his diary confirmed he had discussed the true nature of the 45-minute warning with Mr Blair two weeks before the March 18 vote on the war.    Scepticism was strength ened yesterday by the fact that despite the prominence of the 45-minute claim in the September 2002 dossier and subsequent news reports, Mr Blair did not once refer to it in his speech arguing for war.    A defiant Mr Blair told the Commons yesterday he was still proud to have gone to war against Saddam, even if no WMDs were found in Iraq and no matter what the new inquiry into British intelligence on the war concluded.    The coalition's inspection teams had already turned up enough evidence to justify war because of Saddam's "total, unrepentant, malignant intent" and his violation of UN resolutions, he said.    Mr Blair sought to play down the significance of this week's claims by Brian Jones, who retired as Britain's top WMD analyst last year, that the spy chiefs who decided before the war that Iraq was still producing chemical and biological weapons might have "misinterpreted" crucial information on the issue.    04 February 2004    British Intelligence Chief': 'We were overruled on WMD Dossier' by Paul Waugh (The Independent UK)    The intelligence official whose revelations stunned the Hutton inquiry has suggested that not a single defence intelligence expert backed Tony Blair's most contentious claims on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.    As Mr Blair set up an inquiry yesterday into intelligence failures before the war, Brian Jones, the former leading expert on WMD in the Ministry of Defence, declared that Downing Street's dossier, a key plank in convincing the public of the case for war, was "misleading" on Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological capability. Writing in today's Independent, Dr Jones, who was head of the nuclear, chemical and biological branch of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) until he retired last year, reveals that the experts failed in their efforts to have their views reflected.    Dr Jones, who is expected to be a key witness at the new inquiry, says: "In my view, the expert intelligence analysts of the DIS were overruled in the preparation of the dossier in September 2002, resulting in a presentation that was misleading about Iraq's capabilities."    He calls on the Prime Minister to publish the intelligence behind the Government's claims that Iraq was actively producing chemical weapons and could launch an attack within 45 minutes of an order to do so. He is "extremely doubtful" that anyone with chemical and biological weapons expertise had seen the raw intelligence reports and that they would prove just how right he and his colleagues were to be concerned about the claims.    Downing Street was triumphant last week when Lord Hutton ruled that Andrew Gilligan's claims that the dossier was "sexed up" were unfounded, but Dr Jones's comments are bound to boost the case of the BBC and others that the dossier failed to take into account the worries of intelligence officials. Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, said yesterday that he might not have supported military action against Baghdad if he had known that Iraq lacked weapons of mass destruction.    Acutely aware of the American inquiry into the war, Mr Blair said that a committee of inquiry would investigate "intelligence-gathering, evaluation and use" in the UK before the conflict in Iraq. Lord Butler of Brockwell, the former cabinet secretary, will chair the five-strong committee, which will meet in private. The Liberal Democrats refused to support the inquiry because they said that its remit was not wide enough.    Dr Jones was the man whose decision to give evidence electrified the Hutton inquiry as he disclosed that he had formally complained about the dossier. The Government attempted to dismiss his complaints as part of the normal process of "debate" within the DIS and claimed that other sections of the intelligence community were better qualified to assess the 45-minute and chemical production claims.    But today Dr Jones makes clear that he was not alone and declares that the whole of the Defence Intelligence Staff, Britain's best qualified analysts on WMD, agreed that the claims should have been "carefully caveated". Furthermore, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which allowed the contentious claims to go into the dossier, lacked the expertise to make a competent judgement on them.    Dr Jones makes clear that it was John Scarlett, the chairman of the JIC, who was responsible for including the controversial claims in the executive summary of the dossier that was used to justify war. It was Mr Scarlett's strong assessment that allowed Alastair Campbell to "translate a probability into a certainty" in Mr Blair's foreword to the document, Dr Jones adds.    He says he foresaw at the time of the Government's dossier in September 2002 that no major WMD stockpiles would be found. He made a formal complaint about the dossier to avoid himself and his fellow experts being cast as "scapegoats" for any such failure.    In his article, Dr Jones warns that intelligence analysts should not be blamed for the lack of any significant finds in Iraq and points out that it was the "intelligence community leadership" the heads of MI6 and MI5 and Mr Scarlett who were responsible for the dossier. It would be a "travesty" if the DIS was criticised over the affair, he says.    Dr Jones complains that he and others were not allowed to see vital intelligence supporting the 45-minute and chemical production claims.    He reveals, however, that he has discovered from a colleague that the reports from the ground did not meet his and others' concerns about the wording of the JIC's assessments. Also, he says, the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence, Tony Cragg, did not see the supposedly clinching intelligence and took on trust assurances from MI6 that it was credible.    The Government yesterday finally slipped out its response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's report last autumn on the intelligence case in the approach to war.    For the first time ministers conceded that they "understand the reasoning" for the committee's criticism that the presentation of the 45-minute claim in the dossier "allowed speculation as to its exact meaning", including the firing of WMD on long-range missiles. But the Government said it had not linked the claim to ballistic missiles.    It also rejected the MPs' call for complaints such as that of Dr Jones to be sent direct to the JIC chairman. "It is important to preserve the line management authority of JIC members," it said.    February 4, 2004    "Don't Be Fooled Again" by Jonathan Freedland. (The Guardian/UK)    Where do you even start? Perhaps with the comedy of George Bush demanding "to know the facts" about Iraq's non-existent arsenal of weapons of mass destruction - casting himself as an aggrieved American voter, somehow hoodwinked into the war with Iraq. No doubt we should brace ourselves for Bush pounding his fist on the table, demanding to know "who ordered this goddamned war anyway?" And to think, he could have known all the facts without firing a single shot - if only he had let Hans Blix and his team of UN inspectors finish their work.    Or perhaps we should begin with the hilarious sight of Colin Powell, who exactly a year ago treated the UN security council to a show-and-tell exposé of Saddam's terrifying arsenal, now admitting that, had he known Baghdad had no WMD, he would have had his doubts about going to war. With rather elegant understatement, he concedes it would have changed "the political calculus".    Maybe the right starting point is closer to home, with the alternative comedy of Tony Blair insisting as late as last week there could be no inquiry, no inquiry, no inquiry - until Bush ordered one in Washington and suddenly London saw the entire question in a new light. Now there is to be an inquiry. What was an unnecessary, ludicrous proposal last week when the Tories and Lib Dems demanded it is suddenly a rather good idea now that Mr Bush has smiled upon it.    The government says the trigger was the Senate testimony of Bush's handpicked weapons inspector, David Kay - he who quit as head of the Iraq Survey Group because, he concluded, Iraq's WMD were a mirage. That, says the government, made an inquiry "inevitable". In which case, why was it not signaled as soon as Dr Kay testified last Wednesday? Or even a week earlier when he quit? The truth is that Tony Blair is going into this inquiry the way he went into the war itself: as Tonto to the American Lone Ranger, Mini-Me to George Bush's Dr Evil.    Too cynical? Maybe so. But after last week's experience, deep skepticism is the required mode. For the Hutton episode was something of a loss of innocence for those who had preferred to assume the best of Britain's top institutions. Government allies have assailed the Hutton report's critics with this repeated refrain: "If you think Hutton is such a bad judge, why didn't you say so earlier? You were perfectly happy to accept him when you thought he was going to give Blair a kicking." There is power to this argument, but there is a response. It is that many who suspected the Iraq war was fought on a false basis believed the inquiry system would be fair; that a senior judge would take account of all the evidence he heard, not ignore large chunks of it. These doubters hesitated to rake over the law lord's previous judgments, check out the cases he fought as an advocate, or root out telling details in his biography. Such suspicion would suggest a lack of faith in the ability of a judge to assess each case, and each piece of evidence, on its own merits. For our system to work, all of us have at least to accept the ground rules, don't we?    It turns out we were too trusting. We somehow ignored the injustice of a system that allows the man under suspicion - in this case, the prime minister - to pick the judge who will judge him. We did not probe deeply into why Brian Hutton might have taken Charles Falconer's fancy. We did not parse the precise wording of Hutton's remit because we assumed he would be fair.    Well, we won't get fooled again. Critics of the war should not wait till this latest inquiry into Iraqi WMD is over before they voice their misgivings - only to be accused of questioning the ref's credentials after the match. We should express our concerns right now.    Begin with the remit. After Hutton, we should all be on our guard for narrowly drawn terms of reference that handily exclude any discomfort for the government. Having learned our lesson, what do we spot in yesterday's Commons announcement by Jack Straw? For one thing, there is an ambiguity, arising from a poor bit of wording. The panel is "to examine any discrepancies between the intelligence gathered, evaluated and used by the government before the conflict, and between that intelligence and what has been discovered by the Iraq Survey Group since the end of the conflict". It sounds nerdy, but the meaning of that clumsy sentence all turns on the second "and". One reading is that it allows the inquiry to probe the difference between the raw intelligence and the way it was "used" by the government to make the case for war. Alternatively it could mean the inquiry is only to investigate the difference between the raw data and the actual picture on the ground.    The latter interpretation would favor the government, by putting the spies in the dock alone, forcing them to explain why their estimate proved so wrong - and skipping over the politicians' role entirely. You don't have to be a cynic to expect that this is precisely how the new committee will define its terms. After all, Straw said there was no need to examine the way government processed and presented the intelligence it received - no need because those issues had been so "comprehensively covered by Lord Hutton".    Both Blair and Straw further stressed that the committee would have to stay out of such terrain, not straying into "the political judgment that led us to war". Straw tried to wrap this up in quasi-constitutional mumbo-jumbo, suggesting that for a committee to investigate such a question would represent a usurpation of parliament. That is nonsense. The committee could simply find out whether the case which was put to MPs - and which persuaded many waverers to vote for war a year ago - was sound or bogus. That would be a service to parliament, not a threat.    The Lib Dems saw through this trick, and are to be applauded for refusing to sanction it with their presence on the committee. But the rest of the personnel are worth looking at. We should not wait till his report to note that Lord Butler was until fairly recently a faithful servant of Blair's; that he defended Whitehall chicanery during the arms-to-Iraq affair; and that he took the word of Neil Hamilton and Jonathan Aitken on trust. Nor is it outrageous to observe that Ann Taylor has hardly been distinguished by her independence from the Labour leadership or that Michael Mates has had his own embarrassments. Above all, this group is allowed to do all its work in secret - which will be mightily convenient to those who have set it up.    Of course, I could be misjudging the process entirely. It might deliver a report that at last gets to the truth of how we came to fight a war over weapons that did not exist. If it does, that will prove a pleasant surprise. Until then, we should remain watchful and wary.    © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004    London:February 4, 2004    "British Prime Minister's constantly changing stance on Iraqi threat".( Published by the Telegraph)    Toby Helm traces the shifts in Tony Blair's position since concerns that Saddam Hussein had a hidden arsenal first came to the fore.What the British Government said about the threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction:    BEFORE THE WAR    September 24, 2002: The Government's dossier on the threat from Saddam's weapons - Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Assessment of the British Government - is published    Tony Blair, in his foreword, wrote that the document "discloses that his (Saddam's) military planning allows for some of his WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them".    September 25: Mr Blair said during a Commons debate on Iraq: "His (Saddam's) weapons of mass destruction program is active, detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The WMD program is not shut down. It is up and running now."    November 18: Mr Blair, speaking on radio, made it clear the aim was to disarm Saddam of his WMD, rather than to remove him from power. "I have got no doubt that the purpose of our challenge from the UN is disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. It is not regime change."    January 2003: The Government's "dodgy" dossier on the threat from Iraq is published (compiled in part from an out-of-date PhD thesis).    It says the material shows "how the Iraqi regime is constructed to have and to keep WMD and is now engaged in a campaign of obstruction of the United Nations weapons inspectors".    February 25: Mr Blair reinforced the message that WMD disarmament was the aim and said Saddam could stay in power if he gave up his weapons.    March 18: In the Commons Mr Blair ridiculed claims that Saddam had no WMD. "We are now seriously asked to accept that in the last few years, contrary to all history, contrary to all intelligence, he decided unilaterally to destroy the weapons. Such a claim is palpably absurd."    AFTER THE WAR    April 28, 2003: At a press conference almost three weeks after the fall of Baghdad, Mr Blair said people should not rush to conclude there had been no WMD just because Saddam had not used them.    July 9: Addressing parliamentary select committee chairmen, Mr Blair shifted ground, saying evidence would be found of Saddam's WMD "programs", thereby suggesting the weapons might not turn up. "I have absolutely no doubt at all that we will find evidence of weapons of mass destruction programs."    December 16: On the BBC Mr Blair moved again, saying the investigation was now trying to find out what happened to the WMD. "I'm confident that when the Iraq Survey Group has done its work we will find what's happened to those weapons, because he had them."    The same day, in a broadcast for British Armed Forces Broadcasting, Mr Blair claimed the Iraq Survey Group had made a breakthrough in finding evidence of the programs. "The Iraq Survey Group has already found massive evidence of a huge system of clandestine laboratories, workings by scientists, plans to develop long-range ballistic missiles."    January 12, 2004: Mr Blair tells the BBC's Breakfast with Frost program that he, too, is not sure WMD would be found. "In a land mass twice the size of the UK it may well not be surprising that you don't find where this stuff is hidden."    January 25: In an interview with The Observer Mr Blair said he still had faith in the intelligence. "I can only tell you I believe the intelligence we had at the time. It is absurd to say in respect of any intelligence that it is infallible but, if you ask me what I believe, I believe the intelligence was correct and I think we will have an explanation."    - Telegraph    Melbourne. Australia. February 4, 2004    "Intelligence failures can't be shrugged off" (Editorial the Age Newspaper).    However much the Australian Howard Government apparently wishes to export responsibility for wrong intelligence on Iraq, the lines of inquiry set in train overseas must also be pursued in Australia. Unless Australia is to become a lackey state, Prime Minister John Howard's assertion that almost all the intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction came from US and British sources does not alter domestic responsibilities for the decision to send forces to war. On Monday, Mr Howard conceded that "obviously (intelligence) was independently assessed and so forth". That is Australian intelligence agencies' responsibility. Mr Howard assumed a broader responsibility when he put the case for war a year ago, and US and Australian voters will deliver their judgements this year on the decision-making. But there is another, longer-term concern about the state of intelligence systems on which Australia's security depends. In the US, no less than six political, intelligence and military inquiries have begun. Australia, by contrast, has a joint parliamentary inquiry, which is due to report by next month. This is not the comprehensive, bipartisan review promised in the US, but should identify issues to be investigated further.    Intelligence is, of course, an inherently ambiguous art (Iraq's WMD threat was overstated but its dangerously chaotic and corrupt state was underestimated). We hear suggestions that the Iraqi weapons might yet turn up - Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has hinted forlornly at a Syrian solution to this particular problem - but large WMD stockpiles almost certainly do not exist. Former chief US weapons inspector David Kay has concluded that "we were almost all wrong", to which his United Nations counterpart, Hans Blix, has retorted that postwar findings confirm his team's prewar reports. The Howard Government chose to discount these and bypass the UN, on the basis of flawed intelligence. One of the key benefits of the US alliance is meant to be a reliable flow of raw intelligence to Australia. Thus the intelligence "systems failure", as Dr Kay describes it, is unavoidably Australia's concern, and it is not just a passive recipient of intelligence.    This is not the first time questions have been raised about Australian intelligence agencies, and in particular the Office of National Assessments, which reports to the Prime Minister. In the case of pre-independence East Timor, the Government erred initially in playing down the risk of violence. The Australian public is entitled to ask why the Government admits to so little concern, then and now, about having got it wrong. The key issues are the same: did Australian agencies do their job in independently and critically assessing intelligence material on which the Government relied; and did the Government accurately represent that material, doubts and all, in justifying its actions? The fact that a murderous dictator has been toppled, though welcome in itself, changes none of this. It is simply dangerous not to clear up doubts about government threat assessments.
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